[AUTO-CHERRYPICK] python-jinja2 : addresss CVE-2024-22195, CVE-2024-3…

…4064, CVE-2024-56201, CVE-2024-56326 - branch 3.0-dev (microsoft#11868)

Co-authored-by: Kanishk Bansal <[email protected]>

SPECS/python-jinja2/CVE-2024-22195.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 3bfb481d9e1c469387ecc7717c4c5cba411d8c79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kanishk-Bansal <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2025 06:52:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2024-22195
+
+---
+ src/jinja2/filters.py | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ tests/test_filters.py |  6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jinja2/filters.py b/src/jinja2/filters.py
+index ed07c4c..c7ecc9b 100644
+--- a/src/jinja2/filters.py
++++ b/src/jinja2/filters.py
+@@ -248,13 +248,17 @@ def do_items(value: t.Union[t.Mapping[K, V], Undefined]) -> t.Iterator[t.Tuple[K
+     yield from value.items()
+
+
++_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
++
++
+ @pass_eval_context
+ def do_xmlattr(
+     eval_ctx: "EvalContext", d: t.Mapping[str, t.Any], autospace: bool = True
+ ) -> str:
+     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
+-    All values that are neither `none` nor `undefined` are automatically
+-    escaped:
++
++    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
++    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
+
+     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
+
+@@ -273,12 +277,22 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+
+     As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
+     if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
++
++    .. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
++        Keys with spaces are not allowed.
+     """
+-    rv = " ".join(
+-        f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"'
+-        for key, value in d.items()
+-        if value is not None and not isinstance(value, Undefined)
+-    )
++    items = []
++
++    for key, value in d.items():
++        if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
++            continue
++
++        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
++            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
++
++        items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
++
++    rv = " ".join(items)
+
+     if autospace and rv:
+         rv = " " + rv
+

SPECS/python-jinja2/CVE-2024-34064.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+From 71ac6eb2bb8ff62f7b70ca21b1d33fc59f01396d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kanishk-Bansal <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2025 13:53:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2024-34064
+
+---
+ src/jinja2/filters.py | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jinja2/filters.py b/src/jinja2/filters.py
+index c7ecc9b..bdf6f22 100644
+--- a/src/jinja2/filters.py
++++ b/src/jinja2/filters.py
+@@ -248,7 +248,9 @@ def do_items(value: t.Union[t.Mapping[K, V], Undefined]) -> t.Iterator[t.Tuple[K
+     yield from value.items()
+
+
+-_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
++# Check for characters that would move the parser state from key to value.
++# https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#attribute-name-state
++_attr_key_re = re.compile(r"[\s/>=]", flags=re.ASCII)
+
+
+ @pass_eval_context
+@@ -257,8 +259,14 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+ ) -> str:
+     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
+
+-    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
+-    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
++    **Values** that are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically
++    escaped, safely allowing untrusted user input.
++
++    User input should not be used as **keys** to this filter. If any key
++    contains a space, ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals
++    sign, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Regardless of this, user input
++    should never be used as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated
++    first.
+
+     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
+
+@@ -278,6 +286,10 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+     As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
+     if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
+
++    .. versionchanged:: 3.1.4
++        Keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign
++        are not allowed.
++
+     .. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
+         Keys with spaces are not allowed.
+     """
+@@ -287,8 +299,8 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+         if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
+             continue
+
+-        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
+-            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
++        if _attr_key_re.search(key) is not None:
++            raise ValueError(f"Invalid character in attribute name: {key!r}")
+
+         items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
+
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SPECS/python-jinja2/CVE-2024-56201.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From da58d627323696d5b0167cc9f1cc9e1070b5e18b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kanishk-Bansal <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2025 14:24:25 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-56201
+
+---
+ src/jinja2/compiler.py | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jinja2/compiler.py b/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+index 3458095..27d86c3 100644
+--- a/src/jinja2/compiler.py
++++ b/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+@@ -1122,9 +1122,14 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
+             )
+             self.writeline(f"if {frame.symbols.ref(alias)} is missing:")
+             self.indent()
++            # The position will contain the template name, and will be formatted
++            # into a string that will be compiled into an f-string. Curly braces
++            # in the name must be replaced with escapes so that they will not be
++            # executed as part of the f-string.
++            position = self.position(node).replace("{", "{{").replace("}", "}}")
+             message = (
+                 "the template {included_template.__name__!r}"
+-                f" (imported on {self.position(node)})"
++                f" (imported on {position})"
+                 f" does not export the requested name {name!r}"
+             )
+             self.writeline(
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SPECS/python-jinja2/CVE-2024-56326.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+From 241312a0fb234989db874a723dbb2f05907796d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kanishk-Bansal <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2025 14:40:27 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2024-56326
+
+---
+ src/jinja2/sandbox.py | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+index 06d7414..c3f4a33 100644
+--- a/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
++++ b/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import typing as t
+ from _string import formatter_field_name_split  # type: ignore
+ from collections import abc
+ from collections import deque
++from functools import update_wrapper
+ from string import Formatter
+
+ from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
+@@ -80,20 +81,6 @@ _mutable_spec: t.Tuple[t.Tuple[t.Type, t.FrozenSet[str]], ...] = (
+ )
+
+
+-def inspect_format_method(callable: t.Callable) -> t.Optional[str]:
+-    if not isinstance(
+-        callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
+-    ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
+-        return None
+-
+-    obj = callable.__self__
+-
+-    if isinstance(obj, str):
+-        return obj
+-
+-    return None
+-
+-
+ def safe_range(*args: int) -> range:
+     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
+     MAX_RANGE items.
+@@ -313,6 +300,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+                     except AttributeError:
+                         pass
+                     else:
++                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++                        if fmt is not None:
++                            return fmt
+                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
+                             return value
+                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
+@@ -330,6 +320,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             except (TypeError, LookupError):
+                 pass
+         else:
++            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++            if fmt is not None:
++                return fmt
+             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
+                 return value
+             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
+@@ -345,34 +338,43 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             exc=SecurityError,
+         )
+
+-    def format_string(
+-        self,
+-        s: str,
+-        args: t.Tuple[t.Any, ...],
+-        kwargs: t.Dict[str, t.Any],
+-        format_func: t.Optional[t.Callable] = None,
+-    ) -> str:
+-        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
+-        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
++    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
++        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
++        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
++        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
++        also sandboxed.
+         """
++        if not isinstance(
++            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
++        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
++            return None
++        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
++        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
++            return None
++        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
++        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
+         formatter: SandboxedFormatter
+-        if isinstance(s, Markup):
+-            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=s.escape)
++
++        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
++            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
+         else:
+             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
+
+-        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
+-            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
+-                raise TypeError(
+-                    "format_map() takes exactly one argument"
+-                    f" {len(args) + (kwargs is not None)} given"
+-                )
++        vformat = formatter.vformat
++        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
++            if is_format_map:
++                if kwargs:
++                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
++                if len(args) != 1:
++                    raise TypeError(
++                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
++                    )
++                kwargs = args[0]
++                args = ()
+
+-            kwargs = args[0]
+-            args = ()
++            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+
+-        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
+-        return type(s)(rv)
++        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
+
+     def call(
+         __self,  # noqa: B902
+@@ -382,9 +384,6 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+         **kwargs: t.Any,
+     ) -> t.Any:
+         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
+-        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
+-        if fmt is not None:
+-            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
+
+         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
+         # errors when proxying the call.
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SPECS/python-jinja2/python-jinja2.spec

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 Summary:        A fast and easy to use template engine written in pure Python
 Name:           python-jinja2
 Version:        3.1.2
-Release:        1%{?dist}
+Release:        2%{?dist}
 License:        BSD
 Vendor:         Microsoft Corporation
 Distribution:   Azure Linux
 Group:          Development/Languages/Python
 URL:            https://jinja.pocoo.org/
 Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/j/jinja2/Jinja2-%{version}.tar.gz
+Patch0:         CVE-2024-22195.patch
+Patch1:         CVE-2024-34064.patch
+Patch2:         CVE-2024-56201.patch
+Patch3:         CVE-2024-56326.patch
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
 %description
@@ -33,7 +37,7 @@ inspired non-XML syntax but supports inline expressions and an optional
 sandboxed environment.
 
 %prep
-%autosetup -n Jinja2-%{version}
+%autosetup -p1 -n Jinja2-%{version}
 sed -i 's/\r$//' LICENSE.rst # Fix wrong EOL encoding
 
 %build
@@ -53,6 +57,9 @@ tox -e py%{python3_version_nodots}
 %{python3_sitelib}/Jinja2-%{version}-py%{python3_version}.egg-info
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Jan 2 2025 Kanishk Bansal <[email protected]> - 3.1.2-2
+- Address CVE-2024-22195, CVE-2024-34064, CVE-2024-56201, CVE-2024-56326 with an upstream patch.
+
 * Mon Nov 27 2023 Andrew Phelps <[email protected]> - 3.1.2-1
 - Upgrade to version 3.1.2
 

toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_aarch64.txt

@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ python3-debuginfo-3.12.3-5.azl3.aarch64.rpm
 python3-devel-3.12.3-5.azl3.aarch64.rpm
 python3-flit-core-3.9.0-1.azl3.noarch.rpm
 python3-gpg-1.23.2-2.azl3.aarch64.rpm
-python3-jinja2-3.1.2-1.azl3.noarch.rpm
+python3-jinja2-3.1.2-2.azl3.noarch.rpm
 python3-libcap-ng-0.8.4-1.azl3.aarch64.rpm
 python3-libs-3.12.3-5.azl3.aarch64.rpm
 python3-libxml2-2.11.5-2.azl3.aarch64.rpm

toolkit/resources/manifests/package/toolchain_x86_64.txt

@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ python3-debuginfo-3.12.3-5.azl3.x86_64.rpm
 python3-devel-3.12.3-5.azl3.x86_64.rpm
 python3-flit-core-3.9.0-1.azl3.noarch.rpm
 python3-gpg-1.23.2-2.azl3.x86_64.rpm
-python3-jinja2-3.1.2-1.azl3.noarch.rpm
+python3-jinja2-3.1.2-2.azl3.noarch.rpm
 python3-libcap-ng-0.8.4-1.azl3.x86_64.rpm
 python3-libs-3.12.3-5.azl3.x86_64.rpm
 python3-libxml2-2.11.5-2.azl3.x86_64.rpm