From 49457f9c296a0ef3291f92908f80a2444085609d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Saul Carlin Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 14:26:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] XIP-42: Universal 'allow' and 'block' preferences (#42) * Add XIP-37 .md * Update xip-37-universal-allow-block-preferences.md * Rename to XIP-42 to reflect pull request ID * copy and format edits --------- Co-authored-by: Matt Galligan Co-authored-by: Jennifer Hasegawa <5481259+jhaaaa@users.noreply.github.com> --- ...ip-42-universal-allow-block-preferences.md | 74 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+) create mode 100644 XIPs/xip-42-universal-allow-block-preferences.md diff --git a/XIPs/xip-42-universal-allow-block-preferences.md b/XIPs/xip-42-universal-allow-block-preferences.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae6b26c --- /dev/null +++ b/XIPs/xip-42-universal-allow-block-preferences.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +--- +xip: 42 +title: Universal 'allow' and 'block' preferences +description: +author: Saul Carlin (@saulmc), Nick Molnar (@neekolas), Naomi Plasterer (@nplasterer), Ry Racherbaumer (@rygine) +discussions-to: +status: Draft +type: Standards +category: XRC +created: 2024-02-14 +--- + +## Abstract + +This XIP establishes 'allow' and 'block' permission preferences, enabling users to explicitly specify which contacts should be able to reach them and which should be blocked across all inbox apps. By respecting these preferences, XMTP inbox apps not only shield users from spam but also give them greater control over their contacts. + +*Special thanks to @polmaire for [initiating the discussion](https://github.com/xmtp/XIPs/pull/28/files) that inspired this XIP.* + +## Motivation + +The ability to 'allow' or 'block' contacts is fundamental for safeguarding users' inboxes in messaging. 'Allow' promotes a conversation from a 'request' or 'invitations' UI component to a 'primary inbox' component, while 'Block' gives users the vital ability to remove spam and other unwanted content from their inbox. + +Because XMTP hasn't yet standardized a method for communicating these actions across the network, changing preferences in one app does not affect other inboxes. This results in inbox apps failing to remove unwanted conversations and properly displaying desired communications. + +## Specification + +In code we use `consent` to abbreviate "contact permission preferences", and `denied` as the inverse of `allowed`. + +- **New Message Topic**: `userpreferences-${identifier}` for encrypted `ConsentList` objects (`type: 'allowed' | 'denied', addresses: [string]`). +- **ConsentState Type**: Introduce `ConsentState = 'allowed' | 'denied' | 'unknown'`. +- **Conversation Field**: Add `consentState` to indicate the consent state of a conversation. +- **APIs**: Introduce APIs for retrieving and managing permission preference lists and states. + +## Rationale + +This approach will enable apps to accurately reflect users' contact permission preferences by default, thereby shielding them from spam and granting them more ownership and control over their communications. + +## Backward Compatibility + +Apps must adhere to the logic described below to keep the contact permission preferences on the network synchronized with local app's user preferences, and vice versa. + +Update a contact permission preference in the `ConsentList` on the network in the following scenarios only: + +- A user explicitly denies a contact. For example, the user blocks, unsubscribes from, or otherwise disables messages for the contact. The app should update the corresponding preference in the network to `denied`. +- A user explicitly allows a contact. For example, the user allows, subscribes to, or otherwise enables messages for the contact. The app should update the corresponding preference in the network to `allowed`. +- An existing conversation has an `unknown` contact permission preference, but a legacy permission in the local database exists. The app should update the corresponding preference in the network to match the legacy local preference. +- An existing conversation has an `unknown` contact permission preference, but has an existing response from the user. The app should update the corresponding preference in the network to `allowed`. + +## Test Cases + +Test cases will validate the functionality of sending messages using the new message topic and the handling and interpretation of all three permission preferences. + +## Reference Implementation + +The [reference implementation](https://github.com/xmtp-labs/xmtp-inbox-web/pull/422) in the [XMTP reference client](https://xmtp.chat) demonstrates the integration of contact permission preferences, along with usable code snippets and UI components for allowing and blocking contacts. + +## Security Considerations + +The `identifier` in the topic is derived from the private key using HKDF and SHA256 to ensure that it cannot be linked back to the user. + +### Message Envelope Encryption + +1. Generates a new key via HKDF from the user's identity key. +2. Encrypts the message via AES-256-GCM using the derived encryption key and the user's public key as associated data. Then converts it to a `PrivatePreferencesPayload` protobuf containing the ciphertext, nonce, and salt. + +### Message Envelope Decryption + +1. Decodes the `PrivatePreferencesPayload`. +2. Derives the encryption key via HKDF from the user's identity key. +3. Decrypts the contents via AES-256-GCM using the public key as associated data. + +## Copyright + +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). From c2d45fba914d94b1f3803b19830cb6d7ad6de60d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: J-Ha <5481259+jhaaaa@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 14:27:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Add XIP-43: Permission preference proofs (#45) * first pass * md link fix * edits from feedback per ry --- XIPs/xip-43-permission-pref-proofs.md | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+) create mode 100644 XIPs/xip-43-permission-pref-proofs.md diff --git a/XIPs/xip-43-permission-pref-proofs.md b/XIPs/xip-43-permission-pref-proofs.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1693b98 --- /dev/null +++ b/XIPs/xip-43-permission-pref-proofs.md @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +--- +title: Permission preference proofs +description: Enables recipients to sign to specify inbox permission preferences +author: @rygine @neekolas @saulmc +discussions-to: https://community.xmtp.org/t/xip-43-permission-preference-proofs/552 +status: Draft +type: Standards +category: Interface +created: 2024-02-22 +--- + +## Abstract + +This XIP proposes to add an _optional_ signed payload to conversations that client apps can consider as proof that a recipient has granted a sender permission to reach their main inbox. + +## Motivation + +Today, a recipient must use a full XMTP client to set a universal permission preference such as allowing a sender. This presents challenges to senders due to the XMTP client's bundle size and integration requirements. For integrations such as simple subscribe buttons, these hurdles can be blockers. + +To solve these issues, senders can simply ask users to produce a signature attesting to the permission preference update. Inbox apps can consider this signature as proof that the recipient has explicitly opted in to receive the sender's messages. This eliminates the bundle size problem, as very little code is required to initiate signing a message with a user's wallet. It also greatly simplifies integration by providing a single function to obtain the user’s signature and return an encoded payload to be used by SDKs to verify the granted permission. + +## Specification + +There are 3 components to the proposed workflow: + +1. Obtain a permission signature from the user + _Requires actions by the **sender** and **receiver**_ +2. Create a new conversation with the encoded payload + _Requires actions by the **sender**_ +3. Verify the permission payload to allow the sender + _Requires actions by the **client SDK**_ + +### Obtain a permission signature from the user + +A permission signature must be obtained from a user's wallet, which is then encoded into a payload that can be used by client SDKs to verify and validate opt-in before allowing the sender. + +The decoded payload that must be collected by senders will be defined in a protobuf as follows: + +```protobuf +message PermissionPayload { + // the user's signature in hex format + string signature = 1; + // approximate time when the user signed + uint64 timestamp = 2; + // version of the payload + uint32 payload_version = 3; +} +``` + +The message that will be signed by the user's wallet will contain the sender's address and a timestamp. It must include a human-readable explanation, such as follows. + +```text +XMTP : Grant inbox permission to sender + +Current Time: +From Address: + +For more info: https://xmtp.org/signatures/ +``` + +A light-weight JavaScript bundle will provide a function that will initiate the signing process and return an encoded payload that senders must store on their end. This function is intended to be used as a callback to a click event, such as clicking on a Subscribe button. + +### Create a new conversation with the encoded payload + +Once senders have the encoded payload, they can include it when starting a new conversation with a user. + +An example of what this might look like: + +```ts +const conversation = await client.conversations.newConversation(peerAddress, context, permissionPayload); +``` + +Users who have created a permission signature may not have an identity on the XMTP network. Senders should check for an identity with `Client.canMessage` prior to starting a new conversation. If a user does not yet have an XMTP identity, the sender can routinely check for a network identity and start a conversation when it's found. + +### Verify the permission payload + +In order to finalize the permission preference, SDKs must look for the permission payload in new conversations. Using this payload, SDKs can verify that the current user's wallet signed the permission message and validate that the addresses and timestamp match the expected values. + +Once the permission payload is verified and validated, the SDKs will then update network permission preferences automatically. + +## Backward Compatibility + +The encoded permission payload is an _optional_ parameter when starting a new conversation. Existing conversations will not be affected, and client apps using outdated SDKs will continue to work without updates. + +## Security Considerations + +There are no known negative security implications introduced as a result of collecting a signature from a user and including it as part of a conversation. The contents of the message being signed will be shown to the user beforehand, and the resulting signature is only useful to SDKs connected to the wallet that signed the message. + +## Copyright + +Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).