Merge tag 'rolling-lts/wsl/5.15.167.4' into linux-msft-wsl-5.15.y

Signed-off-by: Mitchell Levy <[email protected]>

Author: chessturo

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1

Documentation/admin-guide/filesystem-monitoring.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+====================================
+File system Monitoring with fanotify
+====================================
+
+File system Error Reporting
+===========================
+
+Fanotify supports the FAN_FS_ERROR event type for file system-wide error
+reporting.  It is meant to be used by file system health monitoring
+daemons, which listen for these events and take actions (notify
+sysadmin, start recovery) when a file system problem is detected.
+
+By design, a FAN_FS_ERROR notification exposes sufficient information
+for a monitoring tool to know a problem in the file system has happened.
+It doesn't necessarily provide a user space application with semantics
+to verify an IO operation was successfully executed.  That is out of
+scope for this feature.  Instead, it is only meant as a framework for
+early file system problem detection and reporting recovery tools.
+
+When a file system operation fails, it is common for dozens of kernel
+errors to cascade after the initial failure, hiding the original failure
+log, which is usually the most useful debug data to troubleshoot the
+problem.  For this reason, FAN_FS_ERROR tries to report only the first
+error that occurred for a file system since the last notification, and
+it simply counts additional errors.  This ensures that the most
+important pieces of information are never lost.
+
+FAN_FS_ERROR requires the fanotify group to be setup with the
+FAN_REPORT_FID flag.
+
+At the time of this writing, the only file system that emits FAN_FS_ERROR
+notifications is Ext4.
+
+A FAN_FS_ERROR Notification has the following format::
+
+  ::
+
+     [ Notification Metadata (Mandatory) ]
+     [ Generic Error Record  (Mandatory) ]
+     [ FID record            (Mandatory) ]
+
+The order of records is not guaranteed, and new records might be added
+in the future.  Therefore, applications must not rely on the order and
+must be prepared to skip over unknown records. Please refer to
+``samples/fanotify/fs-monitor.c`` for an example parser.
+
+Generic error record
+--------------------
+
+The generic error record provides enough information for a file system
+agnostic tool to learn about a problem in the file system, without
+providing any additional details about the problem.  This record is
+identified by ``struct fanotify_event_info_header.info_type`` being set
+to FAN_EVENT_INFO_TYPE_ERROR.
+
+  ::
+
+     struct fanotify_event_info_error {
+          struct fanotify_event_info_header hdr;
+         __s32 error;
+         __u32 error_count;
+     };
+
+The `error` field identifies the type of error using errno values.
+`error_count` tracks the number of errors that occurred and were
+suppressed to preserve the original error information, since the last
+notification.
+
+FID record
+----------
+
+The FID record can be used to uniquely identify the inode that triggered
+the error through the combination of fsid and file handle.  A file system
+specific application can use that information to attempt a recovery
+procedure.  Errors that are not related to an inode are reported with an
+empty file handle of type FILEID_INVALID.

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst

@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ arg4:
     will be performed for all tasks in the task group of ``pid``.
 
 arg5:
-    userspace pointer to an unsigned long for storing the cookie returned by
-    ``PR_SCHED_CORE_GET`` command. Should be 0 for all other commands.
+    userspace pointer to an unsigned long long for storing the cookie returned
+    by ``PR_SCHED_CORE_GET`` command. Should be 0 for all other commands.
 
 In order for a process to push a cookie to, or pull a cookie from a process, it
 is required to have the ptrace access mode: `PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS` to the

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -21,3 +21,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    cross-thread-rsb.rst
    gather_data_sampling.rst
    srso
+   reg-file-data-sampling

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+==================================
+Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
+==================================
+
+Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) is a microarchitectural vulnerability that
+only affects Intel Atom parts(also branded as E-cores). RFDS may allow
+a malicious actor to infer data values previously used in floating point
+registers, vector registers, or integer registers. RFDS does not provide the
+ability to choose which data is inferred. CVE-2023-28746 is assigned to RFDS.
+
+Affected Processors
+===================
+Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_:
+
+   ===================  ============
+   Common name          Family_Model
+   ===================  ============
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT           06_5CH
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT_D         06_5FH
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS      06_7AH
+   ATOM_TREMONT_D          06_86H
+   ATOM_TREMONT            06_96H
+   ALDERLAKE               06_97H
+   ALDERLAKE_L             06_9AH
+   ATOM_TREMONT_L          06_9CH
+   RAPTORLAKE              06_B7H
+   RAPTORLAKE_P            06_BAH
+   ALDERLAKE_N             06_BEH
+   RAPTORLAKE_S            06_BFH
+   ===================  ============
+
+As an exception to this table, Intel Xeon E family parts ALDERLAKE(06_97H) and
+RAPTORLAKE(06_B7H) codenamed Catlow are not affected. They are reported as
+vulnerable in Linux because they share the same family/model with an affected
+part. Unlike their affected counterparts, they do not enumerate RFDS_CLEAR or
+CPUID.HYBRID. This information could be used to distinguish between the
+affected and unaffected parts, but it is deemed not worth adding complexity as
+the reporting is fixed automatically when these parts enumerate RFDS_NO.
+
+Mitigation
+==========
+Intel released a microcode update that enables software to clear sensitive
+information using the VERW instruction. Like MDS, RFDS deploys the same
+mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before an
+attacker can extract the secrets. This is achieved by using the otherwise
+unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a microcode update.
+The microcode clears the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is
+executed.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+VERW is executed by the kernel before returning to user space, and by KVM
+before VMentry. None of the affected cores support SMT, so VERW is not required
+at C-state transitions.
+
+New bits in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+----------------------------------
+Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new
+bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate
+vulnerability and mitigation capability:
+
+- Bit 27 - RFDS_NO - When set, processor is not affected by RFDS.
+- Bit 28 - RFDS_CLEAR - When set, processor is affected by RFDS, and has the
+  microcode that clears the affected buffers on VERW execution.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows to control RFDS mitigation at boot time with the
+parameter "reg_file_data_sampling=". The valid arguments are:
+
+  ==========  =================================================================
+  on          If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
+              on exit to userspace and before entering a VM.
+  off         Disables mitigation.
+  ==========  =================================================================
+
+Mitigation default is selected by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS.
+
+Mitigation status information
+-----------------------------
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and
+which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+	/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: No microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear Register File'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+	 enabled.
+
+References
+----------
+.. [#f1] Affected Processors
+   https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -138,11 +138,10 @@ associated with the source address of the indirect branch. Specifically,
 the BHB might be shared across privilege levels even in the presence of
 Enhanced IBRS.
 
-Currently the only known real-world BHB attack vector is via
-unprivileged eBPF. Therefore, it's highly recommended to not enable
-unprivileged eBPF, especially when eIBRS is used (without retpolines).
-For a full mitigation against BHB attacks, it's recommended to use
-retpolines (or eIBRS combined with retpolines).
+Previously the only known real-world BHB attack vector was via unprivileged
+eBPF. Further research has found attacks that don't require unprivileged eBPF.
+For a full mitigation against BHB attacks it is recommended to set BHI_DIS_S or
+use the BHB clearing sequence.
 
 Attack scenarios
 ----------------
@@ -430,6 +429,23 @@ The possible values in this file are:
   'PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected'  CPU is not affected by PBRSB
   ===========================  =======================================================
 
+  - Branch History Injection (BHI) protection status:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+ * - BHI: Not affected
+   - System is not affected
+ * - BHI: Retpoline
+   - System is protected by retpoline
+ * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
+   - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
+ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
+   - System is protected by software clearing sequence
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable
+   - System is vulnerable to BHI
+ * - BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop
+   - System is vulnerable; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
+
 Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
 vendor. When the necessary microcode is not available, the kernel will
 report vulnerability.
@@ -484,11 +500,18 @@ Spectre variant 2
 
    Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at
    boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against
-   Spectre v2 variant attacks, including cross-thread branch target injections
-   on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, eIBRS enables STIBP too.
+   some Spectre v2 variant attacks. The BHB can still influence the choice of
+   indirect branch predictor entry, and although branch predictor entries are
+   isolated between modes when eIBRS is enabled, the BHB itself is not isolated
+   between modes. Systems which support BHI_DIS_S will set it to protect against
+   BHI attacks.
 
-   Legacy IBRS systems clear the IBRS bit on exit to userspace and
-   therefore explicitly enable STIBP for that
+   On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target
+   injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables
+   STIBP, too.
+
+   AMD Automatic IBRS does not protect userspace, and Legacy IBRS systems clear
+   the IBRS bit on exit to userspace, therefore both explicitly enable STIBP.
 
    The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable
    CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator
@@ -622,9 +645,10 @@ kernel command line.
                 retpoline,generic       Retpolines
                 retpoline,lfence        LFENCE; indirect branch
                 retpoline,amd           alias for retpoline,lfence
-                eibrs                   enhanced IBRS
-                eibrs,retpoline         enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
-                eibrs,lfence            enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
+                eibrs                   Enhanced/Auto IBRS
+                eibrs,retpoline         Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines
+                eibrs,lfence            Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE
+                ibrs                    use IBRS to protect kernel
 
 		Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 		spectre_v2=auto.
@@ -684,6 +708,20 @@ For user space mitigation:
 		spectre_v2=off. Spectre variant 1 mitigations
 		cannot be disabled.
 
+	spectre_bhi=
+
+		[X86] Control mitigation of Branch History Injection
+		(BHI) vulnerability.  This setting affects the deployment
+		of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
+
+		on
+			(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
+			needed.
+		off
+			Disable the mitigation.
+
+For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+
 Mitigation selection guide
 --------------------------
 

Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst

@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ configure specific aspects of kernel behavior to your liking.
    edid
    efi-stub
    ext4
+   filesystem-monitoring
    nfs/index
    gpio/index
    highuid