VP9 will not play using 59.94 fractional rate #3
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[ Upstream commit 241f519 ] This attempts to avoid circular locking dependency between sock_lock and hdev_lock: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.0.0-rc7-03728-g18dd8ab0a783 #3 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u3:2/53 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888000254130 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: iso_conn_del+0xbd/0x1d0 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff9f39a080 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1b5/0x500 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x10e/0xfe0 hci_le_remote_feat_complete_evt+0x17f/0x320 hci_event_packet+0x39c/0x7d0 hci_rx_work+0x2bf/0x950 process_one_work+0x569/0x980 worker_thread+0x2a3/0x6f0 kthread+0x153/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x10e/0xfe0 iso_connect_cis+0x6f/0x5a0 iso_sock_connect+0x1af/0x710 __sys_connect+0x17e/0x1b0 __x64_sys_connect+0x37/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x62/0xcc -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1b51/0x33d0 lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3b0 lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x80 iso_conn_del+0xbd/0x1d0 iso_connect_cfm+0x226/0x680 hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1ed/0x500 hci_event_packet+0x39c/0x7d0 hci_rx_work+0x2bf/0x950 process_one_work+0x569/0x980 worker_thread+0x2a3/0x6f0 kthread+0x153/0x180 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(hci_cb_list_lock); lock(&hdev->lock); lock(hci_cb_list_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by kworker/u3:2/53: #0: ffff8880021d9130 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4ad/0x980 #1: ffff888002387de0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4ad/0x980 #2: ffff888001ac0070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0xc3/0x500 #3: ffffffff9f39a080 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_cis_estabilished_evt+0x1b5/0x500 Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Stable-dep-of: 6a5ad25 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Fix possible circular locking dependency") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit e9d50f7 ] This fixes the following trace caused by attempting to lock cmd_sync_work_lock while holding the rcu_read_lock: kworker/u3:2/212 is trying to lock: ffff888002600910 (&hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_cmd_sync_queue+0xad/0x140 other info that might help us debug this: context-{4:4} 4 locks held by kworker/u3:2/212: #0: ffff8880028c6530 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4dc/0x9a0 #1: ffff888001aafde0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4dc/0x9a0 #2: ffff888002600070 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_cc_le_set_cig_params+0x64/0x4f0 #3: ffffffffa5994b00 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_cc_le_set_cig_params+0x2f9/0x4f0 Fixes: 26afbd8 ("Bluetooth: Add initial implementation of CIS connections") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03 ] During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3 driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding reset tasks: crash> foreach UN bt ... PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067c6000 CPU: 8 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3] #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c ... PID: 290 TASK: c000000036e5f800 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 296 TASK: c000000037a65800 CPU: 21 COMMAND: "kworker/21:1" ... #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 655 TASK: c000000036f49000 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "kworker/16:2" ...:1 #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur. Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER tg3_io_error_detected() has executed: crash> foreach UN bt PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067d2000 CPU: 9 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3] #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88 ... PID: 363 TASK: c000000037564000 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3] #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error recovery is already in progress. Fixes: db84bf4 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize") Signed-off-by: David Christensen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…ress [ Upstream commit 6f1d64b ] Bug report and analysis from Ding Hui. During iSCSI session logout, if another task accesses the shost ipaddress attr, we can get a KASAN UAF report like this: [ 276.942144] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0 [ 276.942535] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881053b45b8 by task cat/4088 [ 276.943511] CPU: 2 PID: 4088 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc8+ #3 [ 276.943997] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 [ 276.944470] Call Trace: [ 276.944943] <TASK> [ 276.945397] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 [ 276.945887] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x1e7 [ 276.946421] print_report+0x36/0x4f [ 276.947358] kasan_report+0xad/0x130 [ 276.948234] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1c0 [ 276.948674] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0 [ 276.949989] iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param+0xad/0x2e0 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.951765] show_host_param_ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS+0xe9/0x130 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.952185] dev_attr_show+0x3f/0x80 [ 276.953005] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1fb/0x3e0 [ 276.953401] seq_read_iter+0x402/0x1020 [ 276.954260] vfs_read+0x532/0x7b0 [ 276.955113] ksys_read+0xed/0x1c0 [ 276.955952] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.956347] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 276.956769] RIP: 0033:0x7f5d3a679222 [ 276.957161] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 32 c0 0b 00 e8 a5 fe 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 [ 276.958009] RSP: 002b:00007ffc864d16a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 276.958431] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f5d3a679222 [ 276.958857] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f5d3a4fe000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 276.959281] RBP: 00007f5d3a4fe000 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 [ 276.959682] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000 [ 276.960126] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557a26dada58 [ 276.960536] </TASK> [ 276.961357] Allocated by task 2209: [ 276.961756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 276.962170] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 276.962557] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7e/0x90 [ 276.962923] __kmalloc+0x5b/0x140 [ 276.963308] iscsi_alloc_session+0x28/0x840 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.963712] iscsi_session_setup+0xda/0xba0 [libiscsi] [ 276.964078] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_create+0x1fd/0x330 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.964431] iscsi_if_create_session.isra.0+0x50/0x260 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.964793] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0xc5a/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.965153] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.965546] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0 [ 276.965905] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30 [ 276.966236] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120 [ 276.966576] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860 [ 276.966923] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170 [ 276.967300] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170 [ 276.967666] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.968028] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 276.968773] Freed by task 2209: [ 276.969111] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 276.969449] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 276.969789] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50 [ 276.970146] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190 [ 276.970470] __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270 [ 276.970816] device_release+0x98/0x210 [ 276.971145] kobject_cleanup+0x101/0x360 [ 276.971462] iscsi_session_teardown+0x3fb/0x530 [libiscsi] [ 276.971775] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy+0xd8/0x130 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.972143] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0x1bf1/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.972485] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.972808] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0 [ 276.973201] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30 [ 276.973544] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120 [ 276.973864] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860 [ 276.974248] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170 [ 276.974583] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170 [ 276.974891] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.975216] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd We can easily reproduce by two tasks: 1. while :; do iscsiadm -m node --login; iscsiadm -m node --logout; done 2. while :; do cat \ /sys/devices/platform/host*/iscsi_host/host*/ipaddress; done iscsid | cat --------------------------------+--------------------------------------- |- iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy | |- iscsi_session_teardown | |- device_release | |- iscsi_session_release ||- dev_attr_show |- kfree | |- show_host_param_ | ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS | |- iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param | |- r/w tcp_sw_host->session (UAF) |- iscsi_host_remove | |- iscsi_host_free | Fix the above bug by splitting the session removal into 2 parts: 1. removal from iSCSI class which includes sysfs and removal from host tracking. 2. freeing of session. During iscsi_tcp host and session removal we can remove the session from sysfs then remove the host from sysfs. At this point we know userspace is not accessing the kernel via sysfs so we can free the session and host. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ding Hui <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…le recovery [ Upstream commit f748784 ] Commit 26f3a02 ("ath11k: allocate smaller chunks of memory for firmware") and commit f6f9296 ("ath11k: qmi: try to allocate a big block of DMA memory first") change ath11k to allocate the memory chunks for target twice while wlan load. It fails for the 1st time because of large memory and then changed to allocate many small chunks for the 2nd time sometimes as below log. 1st time failed: [10411.640620] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi firmware request memory request [10411.640625] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 6881280 [10411.640630] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 3784704 [10411.640658] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi dma allocation failed (6881280 B type 1), will try later with small size [10411.640671] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi delays mem_request 2 [10411.640677] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi respond memory request delayed 1 2nd time success: [10411.642004] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi firmware request memory request [10411.642008] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642012] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642014] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642016] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642018] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642020] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642022] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642024] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642027] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642029] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 [10411.642031] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 458752 [10411.642033] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 131072 [10411.642035] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 [10411.642037] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 [10411.642039] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 [10411.642041] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 [10411.642043] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 [10411.642045] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 524288 [10411.642047] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 4 size 491520 [10411.642049] ath11k_pci 0000:05:00.0: qmi mem seg type 1 size 524288 And then commit 5962f37 ("ath11k: Reuse the available memory after firmware reload") skip the ath11k_qmi_free_resource() which frees the memory chunks while recovery, after that, when run recovery test on WCN6855, a warning happened every time as below and finally leads fail for recovery. [ 159.570318] BUG: Bad page state in process kworker/u16:5 pfn:33300 [ 159.570320] page:0000000096ffdbb9 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33300 [ 159.570324] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 159.570329] raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 159.570332] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 159.570334] page dumped because: nonzero _refcount [ 159.570440] firewire_ohci syscopyarea sysfillrect psmouse sdhci_pci ahci sysimgblt firewire_core fb_sys_fops libahci crc_itu_t cqhci drm sdhci e1000e wmi video [ 159.570460] CPU: 2 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B 5.19.0-rc1-wt-ath+ #3 [ 159.570465] Hardware name: LENOVO 418065C/418065C, BIOS 83ET63WW (1.33 ) 07/29/2011 [ 159.570467] Workqueue: qmi_msg_handler qmi_data_ready_work [qmi_helpers] [ 159.570475] Call Trace: [ 159.570476] <TASK> [ 159.570478] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f [ 159.570486] dump_stack+0x10/0x12 [ 159.570493] bad_page+0xab/0xf0 [ 159.570502] check_free_page_bad+0x66/0x70 [ 159.570511] __free_pages_ok+0x530/0x9a0 [ 159.570517] ? __dev_printk+0x58/0x6b [ 159.570525] ? _dev_printk+0x56/0x72 [ 159.570534] ? qmi_decode+0x119/0x470 [qmi_helpers] [ 159.570543] __free_pages+0x91/0xd0 [ 159.570548] dma_free_contiguous+0x50/0x60 [ 159.570556] dma_direct_free+0xe5/0x140 [ 159.570564] dma_free_attrs+0x35/0x50 [ 159.570570] ath11k_qmi_msg_mem_request_cb+0x2ae/0x3c0 [ath11k] [ 159.570620] qmi_invoke_handler+0xac/0xe0 [qmi_helpers] [ 159.570630] qmi_handle_message+0x6d/0x180 [qmi_helpers] [ 159.570643] qmi_data_ready_work+0x2ca/0x440 [qmi_helpers] [ 159.570656] process_one_work+0x227/0x440 [ 159.570667] worker_thread+0x31/0x3d0 [ 159.570676] ? process_one_work+0x440/0x440 [ 159.570685] kthread+0xfe/0x130 [ 159.570692] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 159.570701] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 159.570712] </TASK> The reason is because when wlan start to recovery, the type, size and count is not same for the 1st and 2nd QMI_WLFW_REQUEST_MEM_IND message, Then it leads the parameter size is not correct for the dma_free_coherent(). For the chunk[1], the actual dma size is 524288 which allocate in the 2nd time of the initial wlan load phase, and the size which pass to dma_free_coherent() is 3784704 which is got in the 1st time of recovery phase, then warning above happened. Change to use prev_size of struct target_mem_chunk for the paramter of dma_free_coherent() since prev_size is the real size of last load/recovery. Also change to check both type and size of struct target_mem_chunk to reuse the memory to avoid mismatch buffer size for target. Then the warning disappear and recovery success. When the 1st QMI_WLFW_REQUEST_MEM_IND for recovery arrived, the trunk[0] is freed in ath11k_qmi_alloc_target_mem_chunk() and then dma_alloc_coherent() failed caused by large size, and then trunk[1] is freed in ath11k_qmi_free_target_mem_chunk(), the left 18 trunks will be reuse for the 2nd QMI_WLFW_REQUEST_MEM_IND message. Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3 Fixes: 5962f37 ("ath11k: Reuse the available memory after firmware reload") Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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Mar 9, 2023
…ress Bug report and analysis from Ding Hui. During iSCSI session logout, if another task accesses the shost ipaddress attr, we can get a KASAN UAF report like this: [ 276.942144] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0 [ 276.942535] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881053b45b8 by task cat/4088 [ 276.943511] CPU: 2 PID: 4088 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc8+ #3 [ 276.943997] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 11/12/2020 [ 276.944470] Call Trace: [ 276.944943] <TASK> [ 276.945397] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 [ 276.945887] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x1e7 [ 276.946421] print_report+0x36/0x4f [ 276.947358] kasan_report+0xad/0x130 [ 276.948234] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1c0 [ 276.948674] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x78/0xe0 [ 276.949989] iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param+0xad/0x2e0 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.951765] show_host_param_ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS+0xe9/0x130 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.952185] dev_attr_show+0x3f/0x80 [ 276.953005] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x1fb/0x3e0 [ 276.953401] seq_read_iter+0x402/0x1020 [ 276.954260] vfs_read+0x532/0x7b0 [ 276.955113] ksys_read+0xed/0x1c0 [ 276.955952] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.956347] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 276.956769] RIP: 0033:0x7f5d3a679222 [ 276.957161] Code: c0 e9 b2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 32 c0 0b 00 e8 a5 fe 01 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 [ 276.958009] RSP: 002b:00007ffc864d16a8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 [ 276.958431] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f5d3a679222 [ 276.958857] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f5d3a4fe000 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 276.959281] RBP: 00007f5d3a4fe000 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 [ 276.959682] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000020000 [ 276.960126] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557a26dada58 [ 276.960536] </TASK> [ 276.961357] Allocated by task 2209: [ 276.961756] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 276.962170] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 276.962557] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7e/0x90 [ 276.962923] __kmalloc+0x5b/0x140 [ 276.963308] iscsi_alloc_session+0x28/0x840 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.963712] iscsi_session_setup+0xda/0xba0 [libiscsi] [ 276.964078] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_create+0x1fd/0x330 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.964431] iscsi_if_create_session.isra.0+0x50/0x260 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.964793] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0xc5a/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.965153] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.965546] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0 [ 276.965905] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30 [ 276.966236] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120 [ 276.966576] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860 [ 276.966923] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170 [ 276.967300] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170 [ 276.967666] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.968028] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 276.968773] Freed by task 2209: [ 276.969111] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 276.969449] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 276.969789] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50 [ 276.970146] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190 [ 276.970470] __kmem_cache_free+0x133/0x270 [ 276.970816] device_release+0x98/0x210 [ 276.971145] kobject_cleanup+0x101/0x360 [ 276.971462] iscsi_session_teardown+0x3fb/0x530 [libiscsi] [ 276.971775] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy+0xd8/0x130 [iscsi_tcp] [ 276.972143] iscsi_if_recv_msg+0x1bf1/0x2660 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.972485] iscsi_if_rx+0x198/0x4b0 [scsi_transport_iscsi] [ 276.972808] netlink_unicast+0x4d5/0x7b0 [ 276.973201] netlink_sendmsg+0x78d/0xc30 [ 276.973544] sock_sendmsg+0xe5/0x120 [ 276.973864] ____sys_sendmsg+0x5fe/0x860 [ 276.974248] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe0/0x170 [ 276.974583] __sys_sendmsg+0xc8/0x170 [ 276.974891] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 276.975216] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd We can easily reproduce by two tasks: 1. while :; do iscsiadm -m node --login; iscsiadm -m node --logout; done 2. while :; do cat \ /sys/devices/platform/host*/iscsi_host/host*/ipaddress; done iscsid | cat --------------------------------+--------------------------------------- |- iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy | |- iscsi_session_teardown | |- device_release | |- iscsi_session_release ||- dev_attr_show |- kfree | |- show_host_param_ | ISCSI_HOST_PARAM_IPADDRESS | |- iscsi_sw_tcp_host_get_param | |- r/w tcp_sw_host->session (UAF) |- iscsi_host_remove | |- iscsi_host_free | Fix the above bug by splitting the session removal into 2 parts: 1. removal from iSCSI class which includes sysfs and removal from host tracking. 2. freeing of session. During iscsi_tcp host and session removal we can remove the session from sysfs then remove the host from sysfs. At this point we know userspace is not accessing the kernel via sysfs so we can free the session and host. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <[email protected]> Acked-by: Ding Hui <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
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Jakub Sitnicki says: ==================== This patch set addresses the syzbot report in [1]. Patch #1 has been suggested by Eric [2]. I extended it to cover the rest of sock_map proto callbacks. Otherwise we would still overflow the stack. Patch #2 contains the actual fix and bug analysis. Patches #3 & #4 add coverage to selftests to trigger the bug. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CANn89iK2UN1FmdUcH12fv_xiZkv2G+Nskvmq7fG6aA_6VKRf6g@mail.gmail.com/ --- v1 -> v2: v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] [v1 didn't hit bpf@ ML by mistake] * pull in Eric's patch to protect against recursion loop bugs (Eric) * add a macro helper to check if pointer is inside a memory range (Eric) ==================== Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
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During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3 driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding reset tasks: crash> foreach UN bt ... PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067c6000 CPU: 8 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3] #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c ... PID: 290 TASK: c000000036e5f800 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 296 TASK: c000000037a65800 CPU: 21 COMMAND: "kworker/21:1" ... #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 655 TASK: c000000036f49000 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "kworker/16:2" ...:1 #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur. Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER tg3_io_error_detected() has executed: crash> foreach UN bt PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067d2000 CPU: 9 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3] #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88 ... PID: 363 TASK: c000000037564000 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3] #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error recovery is already in progress. Fixes: db84bf4 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize") Signed-off-by: David Christensen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.2, take #3 - Yet another fix for non-CPU accesses to the memory backing the VGICv3 subsystem - A set of fixes for the setlftest checking for the S1PTW behaviour after the fix that went in ealier in the cycle
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KASAN reported: [ 9793.708867] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in ice_get_link_speed+0x16/0x30 [ice] [ 9793.709205] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc1271b1c by task kworker/6:1/402 [ 9793.709222] CPU: 6 PID: 402 Comm: kworker/6:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B OE 6.1.0+ #3 [ 9793.709235] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.00.01.0014.070920180847 07/09/2018 [ 9793.709245] Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice] [ 9793.709575] Call Trace: [ 9793.709582] <TASK> [ 9793.709588] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c [ 9793.709613] print_report+0x17f/0x47b [ 9793.709632] ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x5/0x5 [ 9793.709653] ? ice_get_link_speed+0x16/0x30 [ice] [ 9793.709986] ? ice_get_link_speed+0x16/0x30 [ice] [ 9793.710317] kasan_report+0xb7/0x140 [ 9793.710335] ? ice_get_link_speed+0x16/0x30 [ice] [ 9793.710673] ice_get_link_speed+0x16/0x30 [ice] [ 9793.711006] ice_vc_notify_vf_link_state+0x14c/0x160 [ice] [ 9793.711351] ? ice_vc_repr_cfg_promiscuous_mode+0x120/0x120 [ice] [ 9793.711698] ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x7a7/0xc00 [ice] [ 9793.712074] __ice_clean_ctrlq+0x98f/0xd20 [ice] [ 9793.712534] ? ice_bridge_setlink+0x410/0x410 [ice] [ 9793.712979] ? __request_module+0x320/0x520 [ 9793.713014] ? ice_process_vflr_event+0x27/0x130 [ice] [ 9793.713489] ice_service_task+0x11cf/0x1950 [ice] [ 9793.713948] ? io_schedule_timeout+0xb0/0xb0 [ 9793.713972] process_one_work+0x3d0/0x6a0 [ 9793.714003] worker_thread+0x8a/0x610 [ 9793.714031] ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0 [ 9793.714049] kthread+0x164/0x1a0 [ 9793.714071] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 9793.714100] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 9793.714137] </TASK> [ 9793.714151] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 9793.714158] ice_aq_to_link_speed+0x3c/0xffffffffffff3520 [ice] [ 9793.714632] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 9793.714642] ffffffffc1271a00: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 02 f9 [ 9793.714656] ffffffffc1271a80: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 [ 9793.714670] >ffffffffc1271b00: 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 [ 9793.714680] ^ [ 9793.714690] ffffffffc1271b80: 00 00 00 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 [ 9793.714704] ffffffffc1271c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 The ICE_AQ_LINK_SPEED_UNKNOWN define is BIT(15). The value is bigger than both legacy and normal link speed tables. Add one element (0 - unknown) to both tables. There is no need to explicitly set table size, leave it empty. Fixes: 1d0e28a ("ice: Remove and replace ice speed defines with ethtool.h versions") Signed-off-by: Michal Swiatkowski <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]> Tested-by: Gurucharan G <[email protected]> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit e40b801 ] There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic: PID: 5900 TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/1:48" #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7 #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60 #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7 #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715 #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654 #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62 [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19] RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3 RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00 R8: 000000020a34ffff R9: ffff88c1350bbb20 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000010 R14: ffff88c1ab040a50 R15: ffff88c1ea281d00 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc] #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc] #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc] The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link, smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to link group. This breaks the security environment protected by llc_conf_mutex. Fixes: 2d2209f ("net/smc: first part of add link processing as SMC server") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 3a70e0d ] When doing timestamping in lan966x and having PROVE_LOCKING enabled the following warning is shown. ======================================================== WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Tainted: G N -------------------------------------------------------- swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock: c2609f50 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock); <Interrupt> lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: c1001e18 ((&ndev->rs_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x33c #1: c105e7c4 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ndisc_send_skb+0x134/0x81c #2: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x17c/0xc64 #3: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c/0x1224 #4: c3056174 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x354/0x1224 the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock: -> (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8 irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78 irq_thread+0x130/0x278 kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8 irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78 irq_thread+0x130/0x278 kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68 lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0 sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154 sys_send+0x18/0x20 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c } ... key at: [<c174ba0c>] __key.2+0x0/0x8 ... acquired at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68 lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0 sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154 sys_send+0x18/0x20 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c -> (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68 dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388 dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8 linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34 process_one_work+0x284/0x744 worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 IN-SOFTIRQ-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c irq_exit+0x8/0x28 __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c default_idle_call+0x44/0xac do_idle+0xc8/0x138 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c rest_init+0xcc/0x168 arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68 dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388 dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8 linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34 process_one_work+0x284/0x744 worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 } ... key at: [<c175974c>] netdev_xmit_lock_key+0x8/0x1c8 ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c irq_exit+0x8/0x28 __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c default_idle_call+0x44/0xac do_idle+0xc8/0x138 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c rest_init+0xcc/0x168 arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G N 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Hardware name: Generic DT based system unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70 dump_stack_lvl from mark_lock.part.0+0x59c/0x93c mark_lock.part.0 from __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 _raw_spin_lock from sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 __dev_queue_xmit from ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ip6_finish_output2 from ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c ndisc_send_skb from addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 addrconf_rs_timer from call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c call_timer_fn from expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c expire_timers from run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 run_timer_softirq from __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __do_softirq from __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c __irq_exit_rcu from irq_exit+0x8/0x28 irq_exit from __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc Exception stack(0xc1001f20 to 0xc1001f68) 1f20: ffffffff ffffffff 00000001 c011f840 c100e000 c100e000 c1009314 c1009370 1f40: c10f0c1a c0d5e564 c0f5da8c 00000000 00000000 c1001f70 c010f0bc c010f0c0 1f60: 600f0013 ffffffff __irq_svc from arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c arch_cpu_idle from default_idle_call+0x44/0xac default_idle_call from do_idle+0xc8/0x138 do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xcc/0x168 rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 Fix this by using spin_lock_irqsave/spin_lock_irqrestore also inside lan966x_ptp_irq_handler. Fixes: e85a96e ("net: lan966x: Add support for ptp interrupts") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 479d4f0 ] If vc4_hdmi_reset_link() returns -EDEADLK, it means that a deadlock happened in the locking context. This situation should be addressed by dropping all currently held locks and block until the contended lock becomes available. Currently, vc4 is not dealing with the deadlock properly, producing the following output when PROVE_LOCKING is enabled: [ 825.612809] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 825.612852] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 116 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modeset_lock.c:276 drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm] [ 825.613458] Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc raspberrypi_cpufreq brcmfmac brcmutil crct10dif_ce hci_uart cfg80211 btqca btbcm bluetooth vc4 raspberrypi_hwmon snd_soc_hdmi_codec cec clk_raspberrypi ecdh_generic drm_display_helper ecc rfkill drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper pwm_bcm2835 bcm2835_thermal bcm2835_rng rng_core i2c_bcm2835 drm fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6 [ 825.613735] CPU: 1 PID: 116 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc6-01399-g941aae326315 #3 [ 825.613759] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Rev 1.2 (DT) [ 825.613777] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute [drm_kms_helper] [ 825.614038] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 825.614063] pc : drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm] [ 825.614603] lr : drm_helper_probe_detect+0x120/0x1b4 [drm_kms_helper] [ 825.614829] sp : ffff800008313bf0 [ 825.614844] x29: ffff800008313bf0 x28: ffffcd7778b8b000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 825.614883] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffff677cc35c2758 [ 825.614920] x23: ffffcd7707d01430 x22: ffffcd7707c3edc7 x21: 0000000000000001 [ 825.614958] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800008313c10 x18: 000000000000b6d3 [ 825.614995] x17: ffffcd777835e214 x16: ffffcd7777cef870 x15: fffff81000000000 [ 825.615033] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000099 x12: 0000000000000002 [ 825.615070] x11: 72917988020af800 x10: 72917988020af800 x9 : 72917988020af800 [ 825.615108] x8 : ffff677cc665e0a8 x7 : d00a8c180000110c x6 : ffffcd77774c0054 [ 825.615145] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 825.615181] x2 : ffff677cc55e1880 x1 : ffffcd7777cef8ec x0 : ffff800008313c10 [ 825.615219] Call trace: [ 825.615232] drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm] [ 825.615773] drm_helper_probe_detect+0x120/0x1b4 [drm_kms_helper] [ 825.616003] output_poll_execute+0xe4/0x224 [drm_kms_helper] [ 825.616233] process_one_work+0x2b4/0x618 [ 825.616264] worker_thread+0x24c/0x464 [ 825.616288] kthread+0xec/0x110 [ 825.616310] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 825.616335] irq event stamp: 7634 [ 825.616349] hardirqs last enabled at (7633): [<ffffcd777831ee90>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x3c/0x78 [ 825.616384] hardirqs last disabled at (7634): [<ffffcd7778315a78>] __schedule+0x134/0x9f0 [ 825.616411] softirqs last enabled at (7630): [<ffffcd7707aacea0>] local_bh_enable+0x4/0x30 [ipv6] [ 825.617019] softirqs last disabled at (7618): [<ffffcd7707aace70>] local_bh_disable+0x4/0x30 [ipv6] [ 825.617586] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Therefore, deal with the deadlock as suggested by [1], using the function drm_modeset_backoff(). [1] https://docs.kernel.org/gpu/drm-kms.html?highlight=kms#kms-locking Fixes: 6bed2ea ("drm/vc4: hdmi: Reset link on hotplug") Reported-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <[email protected]> Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 91621be ] When --overwrite and --max-size options of perf record are used together, a segmentation fault occurs. The following is an example: # perf record -e sched:sched* --overwrite --max-size 1K -a -- sleep 1 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] perf: Segmentation fault Obtained 12 stack frames. ./perf/perf(+0x197673) [0x55f99710b673] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x3ef0f) [0x7fa45f3cff0f] ./perf/perf(+0x8eb40) [0x55f997002b40] ./perf/perf(+0x1f6882) [0x55f99716a882] ./perf/perf(+0x794c2) [0x55f996fed4c2] ./perf/perf(+0x7b7c7) [0x55f996fef7c7] ./perf/perf(+0x9074b) [0x55f99700474b] ./perf/perf(+0x12e23c) [0x55f9970a223c] ./perf/perf(+0x12e54a) [0x55f9970a254a] ./perf/perf(+0x7db60) [0x55f996ff1b60] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe6) [0x7fa45f3b2c86] ./perf/perf(+0x7dfe9) [0x55f996ff1fe9] Segmentation fault (core dumped) backtrace of the core file is as follows: (gdb) bt #0 record__bytes_written (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:234 #1 record__output_max_size_exceeded (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:242 #2 record__write (map=0x0, size=12816, bf=0x55f9978da2e0, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:263 #3 process_synthesized_event (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, event=event@entry=0x55f9978da2e0, sample=sample@entry=0x0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at builtin-record.c:618 #4 0x000055f99716a883 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=0x55f9978928b0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658, from=from@entry=0) at util/synthetic-events.c:1895 #5 0x000055f99716a91f in perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=<optimized out>, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at util/synthetic-events.c:1905 #6 0x000055f996fed4c3 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=true, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1997 #7 0x000055f996fef7c8 in __cmd_record (argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffc67551260, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:2802 #8 0x000055f99700474c in cmd_record (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at builtin-record.c:4258 #9 0x000055f9970a223d in run_builtin (p=0x55f997564d88 <commands+264>, argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:330 #10 0x000055f9970a254b in handle_internal_command (argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:384 #11 0x000055f996ff1b61 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:428 #12 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:562 The reason is that record__bytes_written accesses the freed memory rec->thread_data, The process is as follows: __cmd_record -> record__free_thread_data -> zfree(&rec->thread_data) // free rec->thread_data -> record__synthesize -> perf_event__synthesize_id_index -> process_synthesized_event -> record__write -> record__bytes_written // access rec->thread_data We add a member variable "thread_bytes_written" in the struct "record" to save the data size written by the threads. Fixes: 6d57581 ("perf record: Add support for limit perf output file size") Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Jiwei Sun <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAM9d7ci_TRrqBQVQNW8=GwakUr7SsZpYxaaty-S4bxF8zJWyqw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 60eed1e upstream. code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 951df98 upstream. UBSAN complains about invalid value for bool: [ 101.165172] [drm] Initialized gud 1.0.0 20200422 for 2-3.2:1.0 on minor 1 [ 101.213360] gud 2-3.2:1.0: [drm] fb1: guddrmfb frame buffer device [ 101.213426] usbcore: registered new interface driver gud [ 101.989431] ================================================================================ [ 101.989441] UBSAN: invalid-load in linux/include/linux/iosys-map.h:253:9 [ 101.989447] load of value 121 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' [ 101.989451] CPU: 1 PID: 455 Comm: kworker/1:6 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-gud-5.18-rc5 #3 [ 101.989456] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook 820 G1/1991, BIOS L71 Ver. 01.44 04/12/2018 [ 101.989459] Workqueue: events_long gud_flush_work [gud] [ 101.989471] Call Trace: [ 101.989474] <TASK> [ 101.989479] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f [ 101.989488] dump_stack+0x10/0x12 [ 101.989493] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3b [ 101.989498] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x44/0x49 [ 101.989504] dma_buf_vmap.cold+0x38/0x3d [ 101.989511] ? find_busiest_group+0x48/0x300 [ 101.989520] drm_gem_shmem_vmap+0x76/0x1b0 [drm_shmem_helper] [ 101.989528] drm_gem_shmem_object_vmap+0x9/0xb [drm_shmem_helper] [ 101.989535] drm_gem_vmap+0x26/0x60 [drm] [ 101.989594] drm_gem_fb_vmap+0x47/0x150 [drm_kms_helper] [ 101.989630] gud_prep_flush+0xc1/0x710 [gud] [ 101.989639] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40 [ 101.989648] gud_flush_work+0x1e0/0x430 [gud] [ 101.989653] ? __switch_to+0x11d/0x470 [ 101.989664] process_one_work+0x21f/0x3f0 [ 101.989673] worker_thread+0x200/0x3e0 [ 101.989679] ? rescuer_thread+0x390/0x390 [ 101.989684] kthread+0xfd/0x130 [ 101.989690] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 101.989696] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 101.989706] </TASK> [ 101.989708] ================================================================================ The source of this warning is in iosys_map_clear() called from dma_buf_vmap(). It conditionally sets values based on map->is_iomem. The iosys_map variables are allocated uninitialized on the stack leading to ->is_iomem having all kinds of values and not only 0/1. Fix this by zeroing the iosys_map variables. Fixes: 40e1a70 ("drm: Add GUD USB Display driver") Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.18+ Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noralf Trønnes <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 3dca1f8 ] Don't hold sdw_dev_lock while calling the peripheral driver probe() and remove() callbacks. Holding sdw_dev_lock around the probe() and remove() calls causes a theoretical mutex inversion which lockdep will assert on. During probe() the sdw_dev_lock mutex is taken first and then ASoC/ALSA locks are taken by the probe() implementation. During normal operation ASoC can take its locks and then trigger a runtime resume of the component. The SoundWire resume will then take sdw_dev_lock. This is the reverse order compared to probe(). It's not necessary to hold sdw_dev_lock when calling the probe() and remove(), it is only used to prevent the bus core calling the driver callbacks if there isn't a driver or the driver is removing. All calls to the driver callbacks are guarded by the 'probed' flag. So if sdw_dev_lock is held while setting and clearing the 'probed' flag this is sufficient to guarantee the safety of callback functions. Removing the mutex from around the call to probe() means that it is now possible for a bus event (PING response) to be handled in parallel with the probe(). But sdw_bus_probe() already has handling for this by calling the device update_status() after the probe() has completed. Example lockdep assert: [ 46.098514] ====================================================== [ 46.104736] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 46.110961] 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 Tainted: G E [ 46.116842] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 46.123063] mpg123/1130 is trying to acquire lock: [ 46.127883] ffff8b445031fb80 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.137225] but task is already holding lock: [ 46.143074] ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830 [ 46.151536] which lock already depends on the new lock.[ 46.159732] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 46.167231] -> #4 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.173428] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.177542] snd_soc_dpcm_runtime_update+0x2e/0x100 [ 46.182958] snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double+0x1c2/0x200 [ 46.188548] snd_ctl_elem_write+0x10c/0x1d0 [ 46.193268] snd_ctl_ioctl+0x126/0x850 [ 46.197556] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 [ 46.201845] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.205959] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.211553] -> #3 (&card->controls_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 46.218188] down_write+0x2b/0xd0 [ 46.222038] snd_ctl_add_replace+0x39/0xb0 [ 46.226672] snd_soc_add_controls+0x53/0x80 [ 46.231393] soc_probe_component+0x1e4/0x2a0 [ 46.236202] snd_soc_bind_card+0x51a/0xc80 [ 46.240836] devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90 [ 46.246079] mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw] [ 46.251500] platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0 [ 46.255700] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.259814] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.264710] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.269347] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.273721] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.278098] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.282473] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.286759] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.291136] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.295422] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.300321] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.304434] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.310027] -> #2 (&card->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.315883] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.320000] snd_soc_bind_card+0x3e/0xc80 [ 46.324551] devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90 [ 46.329798] mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw] [ 46.335219] platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0 [ 46.339420] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.343532] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.348430] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.353065] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.357437] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.361812] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.366716] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.371528] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.376424] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.381239] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.386665] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.391299] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.397416] -> #1 (client_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.404307] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.408941] snd_soc_add_component+0x24/0x2c0 [ 46.414345] devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x54/0xa0 [ 46.420522] cs35l56_common_probe+0x280/0x370 [snd_soc_cs35l56] [ 46.427487] cs35l56_sdw_probe+0xf4/0x170 [snd_soc_cs35l56_sdw] [ 46.434442] sdw_drv_probe+0x80/0x1a0 [ 46.439136] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.443738] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.449120] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.454247] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.459106] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.463971] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.468825] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.473592] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.478441] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.483202] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.488572] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.493158] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.499229] -> #0 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.506737] __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0 [ 46.511765] lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300 [ 46.516360] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.520949] sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.526409] sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0 [ 46.531783] intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0 [ 46.537155] __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120 [ 46.541919] rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70 [ 46.546422] rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0 [ 46.550920] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80 [ 46.556024] snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0 [ 46.562611] __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520 [ 46.567375] dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210 [ 46.572661] dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830 [ 46.577597] snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0 [ 46.583145] snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200 [ 46.588341] snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80 [ 46.593625] chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250 [ 46.598129] do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430 [ 46.602981] path_openat+0x75e/0xa80 [ 46.607575] do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160 [ 46.612162] do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160 [ 46.616922] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 46.621767] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.626352] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.632414] other info that might help us debug this:[ 46.641862] Chain exists of: &slave->sdw_dev_lock --> &card->controls_rwsem --> &card->pcm_mutex[ 46.655145] Possible unsafe locking scenario:[ 46.662048] CPU0 CPU1 [ 46.667080] ---- ---- [ 46.672108] lock(&card->pcm_mutex); [ 46.676267] lock(&card->controls_rwsem); [ 46.683382] lock(&card->pcm_mutex); [ 46.690063] lock(&slave->sdw_dev_lock); [ 46.694574] *** DEADLOCK ***[ 46.701942] 2 locks held by mpg123/1130: [ 46.706356] #0: ffff8b4457b22b90 (&pcm->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xc9/0x200 [ 46.715999] #1: ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830 [ 46.725390] stack backtrace: [ 46.730752] CPU: 0 PID: 1130 Comm: mpg123 Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 [ 46.739703] Hardware name: AAEON UP-WHL01/UP-WHL01, BIOS UPW1AM19 11/10/2020 [ 46.747270] Call Trace: [ 46.750239] <TASK> [ 46.752857] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73 [ 46.757045] check_noncircular+0x102/0x120 [ 46.761664] __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0 [ 46.766197] lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300 [ 46.770292] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.775432] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 [ 46.780143] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.784241] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.789387] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 46.793750] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.798894] ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0 [ 46.803262] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x250 [ 46.808315] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.813456] sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.818422] sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0 [ 46.823302] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.828706] intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0 [ 46.833583] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [ 46.838462] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.843866] __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120 [ 46.848142] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.853550] rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70 [ 46.857568] rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0 [ 46.861578] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x62/0x70 [ 46.866634] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80 [ 46.871258] snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0 [ 46.877358] __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520 [ 46.881634] ? dpcm_add_paths.isra.0+0x35d/0x4c0 [ 46.886784] dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210 [ 46.891592] dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830 [ 46.896046] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x50 [ 46.900591] snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0 [ 46.905658] snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200 [ 46.910376] ? wake_up_q+0x90/0x90 [ 46.914312] snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80 [ 46.919118] chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250 [ 46.923147] ? cdev_device_add+0x90/0x90 [ 46.927608] do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430 [ 46.931976] path_openat+0x75e/0xa80 [ 46.936086] do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160 [ 46.940194] ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0 [ 46.944563] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 [ 46.949101] do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160 [ 46.953377] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 46.957733] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.961829] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.967402] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6397ccd3b [ 46.971506] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25 [ 46.991413] RSP: 002b:00007fff838e8990 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [ 46.999580] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000080802 RCX: 00007fa6397ccd3b [ 47.007311] RDX: 0000000000080802 RSI: 00007fff838e8b50 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 47.015047] RBP: 00007fff838e8b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000011 [ 47.022787] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000080802 [ 47.030539] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff838e8b50 [ 47.038289] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit e40b801 ] There is a certain chance to trigger the following panic: PID: 5900 TASK: ffff88c1c8af4100 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "kworker/1:48" #0 [ffff9456c1cc79a0] machine_kexec at ffffffff870665b7 #1 [ffff9456c1cc79f0] __crash_kexec at ffffffff871b4c7a #2 [ffff9456c1cc7ab0] crash_kexec at ffffffff871b5b60 #3 [ffff9456c1cc7ac0] oops_end at ffffffff87026ce7 #4 [ffff9456c1cc7ae0] page_fault_oops at ffffffff87075715 #5 [ffff9456c1cc7b58] exc_page_fault at ffffffff87ad0654 #6 [ffff9456c1cc7b80] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff87c00b62 [exception RIP: ib_alloc_mr+19] RIP: ffffffffc0c9cce3 RSP: ffff9456c1cc7c38 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000004 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88c1ea281d00 R8: 000000020a34ffff R9: ffff88c1350bbb20 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000010 R14: ffff88c1ab040a50 R15: ffff88c1ea281d00 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff9456c1cc7c60] smc_ib_get_memory_region at ffffffffc0aff6df [smc] #8 [ffff9456c1cc7c88] smcr_buf_map_link at ffffffffc0b0278c [smc] #9 [ffff9456c1cc7ce0] __smc_buf_create at ffffffffc0b03586 [smc] The reason here is that when the server tries to create a second link, smc_llc_srv_add_link() has no protection and may add a new link to link group. This breaks the security environment protected by llc_conf_mutex. Fixes: 2d2209f ("net/smc: first part of add link processing as SMC server") Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 3a70e0d ] When doing timestamping in lan966x and having PROVE_LOCKING enabled the following warning is shown. ======================================================== WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Tainted: G N -------------------------------------------------------- swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock: c2609f50 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock); <Interrupt> lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: c1001e18 ((&ndev->rs_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x33c #1: c105e7c4 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ndisc_send_skb+0x134/0x81c #2: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x17c/0xc64 #3: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c/0x1224 #4: c3056174 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x354/0x1224 the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock: -> (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8 irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78 irq_thread+0x130/0x278 kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8 irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78 irq_thread+0x130/0x278 kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68 lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0 sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154 sys_send+0x18/0x20 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c } ... key at: [<c174ba0c>] __key.2+0x0/0x8 ... acquired at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68 lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0 sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154 sys_send+0x18/0x20 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c -> (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68 dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388 dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8 linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34 process_one_work+0x284/0x744 worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 IN-SOFTIRQ-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c irq_exit+0x8/0x28 __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c default_idle_call+0x44/0xac do_idle+0xc8/0x138 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c rest_init+0xcc/0x168 arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68 dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388 dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8 linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34 process_one_work+0x284/0x744 worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 } ... key at: [<c175974c>] netdev_xmit_lock_key+0x8/0x1c8 ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c irq_exit+0x8/0x28 __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c default_idle_call+0x44/0xac do_idle+0xc8/0x138 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c rest_init+0xcc/0x168 arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G N 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Hardware name: Generic DT based system unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70 dump_stack_lvl from mark_lock.part.0+0x59c/0x93c mark_lock.part.0 from __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 _raw_spin_lock from sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 __dev_queue_xmit from ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ip6_finish_output2 from ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c ndisc_send_skb from addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 addrconf_rs_timer from call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c call_timer_fn from expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c expire_timers from run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 run_timer_softirq from __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __do_softirq from __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c __irq_exit_rcu from irq_exit+0x8/0x28 irq_exit from __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc Exception stack(0xc1001f20 to 0xc1001f68) 1f20: ffffffff ffffffff 00000001 c011f840 c100e000 c100e000 c1009314 c1009370 1f40: c10f0c1a c0d5e564 c0f5da8c 00000000 00000000 c1001f70 c010f0bc c010f0c0 1f60: 600f0013 ffffffff __irq_svc from arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c arch_cpu_idle from default_idle_call+0x44/0xac default_idle_call from do_idle+0xc8/0x138 do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xcc/0x168 rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 Fix this by using spin_lock_irqsave/spin_lock_irqrestore also inside lan966x_ptp_irq_handler. Fixes: e85a96e ("net: lan966x: Add support for ptp interrupts") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 479d4f0 ] If vc4_hdmi_reset_link() returns -EDEADLK, it means that a deadlock happened in the locking context. This situation should be addressed by dropping all currently held locks and block until the contended lock becomes available. Currently, vc4 is not dealing with the deadlock properly, producing the following output when PROVE_LOCKING is enabled: [ 825.612809] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 825.612852] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 116 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modeset_lock.c:276 drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm] [ 825.613458] Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc raspberrypi_cpufreq brcmfmac brcmutil crct10dif_ce hci_uart cfg80211 btqca btbcm bluetooth vc4 raspberrypi_hwmon snd_soc_hdmi_codec cec clk_raspberrypi ecdh_generic drm_display_helper ecc rfkill drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper pwm_bcm2835 bcm2835_thermal bcm2835_rng rng_core i2c_bcm2835 drm fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6 [ 825.613735] CPU: 1 PID: 116 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc6-01399-g941aae326315 #3 [ 825.613759] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Rev 1.2 (DT) [ 825.613777] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute [drm_kms_helper] [ 825.614038] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 825.614063] pc : drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm] [ 825.614603] lr : drm_helper_probe_detect+0x120/0x1b4 [drm_kms_helper] [ 825.614829] sp : ffff800008313bf0 [ 825.614844] x29: ffff800008313bf0 x28: ffffcd7778b8b000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 825.614883] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffff677cc35c2758 [ 825.614920] x23: ffffcd7707d01430 x22: ffffcd7707c3edc7 x21: 0000000000000001 [ 825.614958] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800008313c10 x18: 000000000000b6d3 [ 825.614995] x17: ffffcd777835e214 x16: ffffcd7777cef870 x15: fffff81000000000 [ 825.615033] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000099 x12: 0000000000000002 [ 825.615070] x11: 72917988020af800 x10: 72917988020af800 x9 : 72917988020af800 [ 825.615108] x8 : ffff677cc665e0a8 x7 : d00a8c180000110c x6 : ffffcd77774c0054 [ 825.615145] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 825.615181] x2 : ffff677cc55e1880 x1 : ffffcd7777cef8ec x0 : ffff800008313c10 [ 825.615219] Call trace: [ 825.615232] drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm] [ 825.615773] drm_helper_probe_detect+0x120/0x1b4 [drm_kms_helper] [ 825.616003] output_poll_execute+0xe4/0x224 [drm_kms_helper] [ 825.616233] process_one_work+0x2b4/0x618 [ 825.616264] worker_thread+0x24c/0x464 [ 825.616288] kthread+0xec/0x110 [ 825.616310] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 825.616335] irq event stamp: 7634 [ 825.616349] hardirqs last enabled at (7633): [<ffffcd777831ee90>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x3c/0x78 [ 825.616384] hardirqs last disabled at (7634): [<ffffcd7778315a78>] __schedule+0x134/0x9f0 [ 825.616411] softirqs last enabled at (7630): [<ffffcd7707aacea0>] local_bh_enable+0x4/0x30 [ipv6] [ 825.617019] softirqs last disabled at (7618): [<ffffcd7707aace70>] local_bh_disable+0x4/0x30 [ipv6] [ 825.617586] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Therefore, deal with the deadlock as suggested by [1], using the function drm_modeset_backoff(). [1] https://docs.kernel.org/gpu/drm-kms.html?highlight=kms#kms-locking Fixes: 6bed2ea ("drm/vc4: hdmi: Reset link on hotplug") Reported-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <[email protected]> Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 91621be ] When --overwrite and --max-size options of perf record are used together, a segmentation fault occurs. The following is an example: # perf record -e sched:sched* --overwrite --max-size 1K -a -- sleep 1 [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ] perf: Segmentation fault Obtained 12 stack frames. ./perf/perf(+0x197673) [0x55f99710b673] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(+0x3ef0f) [0x7fa45f3cff0f] ./perf/perf(+0x8eb40) [0x55f997002b40] ./perf/perf(+0x1f6882) [0x55f99716a882] ./perf/perf(+0x794c2) [0x55f996fed4c2] ./perf/perf(+0x7b7c7) [0x55f996fef7c7] ./perf/perf(+0x9074b) [0x55f99700474b] ./perf/perf(+0x12e23c) [0x55f9970a223c] ./perf/perf(+0x12e54a) [0x55f9970a254a] ./perf/perf(+0x7db60) [0x55f996ff1b60] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe6) [0x7fa45f3b2c86] ./perf/perf(+0x7dfe9) [0x55f996ff1fe9] Segmentation fault (core dumped) backtrace of the core file is as follows: (gdb) bt #0 record__bytes_written (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:234 #1 record__output_max_size_exceeded (rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:242 #2 record__write (map=0x0, size=12816, bf=0x55f9978da2e0, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:263 #3 process_synthesized_event (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, event=event@entry=0x55f9978da2e0, sample=sample@entry=0x0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at builtin-record.c:618 #4 0x000055f99716a883 in __perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=0x55f9978928b0, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658, from=from@entry=0) at util/synthetic-events.c:1895 #5 0x000055f99716a91f in perf_event__synthesize_id_index (tool=tool@entry=0x55f99755a200 <record>, process=process@entry=0x55f997002aa0 <process_synthesized_event>, evlist=<optimized out>, machine=machine@entry=0x55f997893658) at util/synthetic-events.c:1905 #6 0x000055f996fed4c3 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=true, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1997 #7 0x000055f996fef7c8 in __cmd_record (argc=argc@entry=2, argv=argv@entry=0x7ffc67551260, rec=0x55f99755a200 <record>) at builtin-record.c:2802 #8 0x000055f99700474c in cmd_record (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at builtin-record.c:4258 #9 0x000055f9970a223d in run_builtin (p=0x55f997564d88 <commands+264>, argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:330 #10 0x000055f9970a254b in handle_internal_command (argc=10, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:384 #11 0x000055f996ff1b61 in run_argv (argcp=<synthetic pointer>, argv=<synthetic pointer>) at perf.c:428 #12 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=0x7ffc67551260) at perf.c:562 The reason is that record__bytes_written accesses the freed memory rec->thread_data, The process is as follows: __cmd_record -> record__free_thread_data -> zfree(&rec->thread_data) // free rec->thread_data -> record__synthesize -> perf_event__synthesize_id_index -> process_synthesized_event -> record__write -> record__bytes_written // access rec->thread_data We add a member variable "thread_bytes_written" in the struct "record" to save the data size written by the threads. Fixes: 6d57581 ("perf record: Add support for limit perf output file size") Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <[email protected]> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Jiwei Sun <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAM9d7ci_TRrqBQVQNW8=GwakUr7SsZpYxaaty-S4bxF8zJWyqw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit 60eed1e upstream. code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]> Cc: Joel Becker <[email protected]> Cc: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]> Cc: Changwei Ge <[email protected]> Cc: Gang He <[email protected]> Cc: Jun Piao <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 951df98 upstream. UBSAN complains about invalid value for bool: [ 101.165172] [drm] Initialized gud 1.0.0 20200422 for 2-3.2:1.0 on minor 1 [ 101.213360] gud 2-3.2:1.0: [drm] fb1: guddrmfb frame buffer device [ 101.213426] usbcore: registered new interface driver gud [ 101.989431] ================================================================================ [ 101.989441] UBSAN: invalid-load in linux/include/linux/iosys-map.h:253:9 [ 101.989447] load of value 121 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' [ 101.989451] CPU: 1 PID: 455 Comm: kworker/1:6 Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-gud-5.18-rc5 #3 [ 101.989456] Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP EliteBook 820 G1/1991, BIOS L71 Ver. 01.44 04/12/2018 [ 101.989459] Workqueue: events_long gud_flush_work [gud] [ 101.989471] Call Trace: [ 101.989474] <TASK> [ 101.989479] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5f [ 101.989488] dump_stack+0x10/0x12 [ 101.989493] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3b [ 101.989498] __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value.cold+0x44/0x49 [ 101.989504] dma_buf_vmap.cold+0x38/0x3d [ 101.989511] ? find_busiest_group+0x48/0x300 [ 101.989520] drm_gem_shmem_vmap+0x76/0x1b0 [drm_shmem_helper] [ 101.989528] drm_gem_shmem_object_vmap+0x9/0xb [drm_shmem_helper] [ 101.989535] drm_gem_vmap+0x26/0x60 [drm] [ 101.989594] drm_gem_fb_vmap+0x47/0x150 [drm_kms_helper] [ 101.989630] gud_prep_flush+0xc1/0x710 [gud] [ 101.989639] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x17/0x40 [ 101.989648] gud_flush_work+0x1e0/0x430 [gud] [ 101.989653] ? __switch_to+0x11d/0x470 [ 101.989664] process_one_work+0x21f/0x3f0 [ 101.989673] worker_thread+0x200/0x3e0 [ 101.989679] ? rescuer_thread+0x390/0x390 [ 101.989684] kthread+0xfd/0x130 [ 101.989690] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 101.989696] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 101.989706] </TASK> [ 101.989708] ================================================================================ The source of this warning is in iosys_map_clear() called from dma_buf_vmap(). It conditionally sets values based on map->is_iomem. The iosys_map variables are allocated uninitialized on the stack leading to ->is_iomem having all kinds of values and not only 0/1. Fix this by zeroing the iosys_map variables. Fixes: 40e1a70 ("drm: Add GUD USB Display driver") Cc: <[email protected]> # v5.18+ Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Noralf Trønnes <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 3dca1f8 ] Don't hold sdw_dev_lock while calling the peripheral driver probe() and remove() callbacks. Holding sdw_dev_lock around the probe() and remove() calls causes a theoretical mutex inversion which lockdep will assert on. During probe() the sdw_dev_lock mutex is taken first and then ASoC/ALSA locks are taken by the probe() implementation. During normal operation ASoC can take its locks and then trigger a runtime resume of the component. The SoundWire resume will then take sdw_dev_lock. This is the reverse order compared to probe(). It's not necessary to hold sdw_dev_lock when calling the probe() and remove(), it is only used to prevent the bus core calling the driver callbacks if there isn't a driver or the driver is removing. All calls to the driver callbacks are guarded by the 'probed' flag. So if sdw_dev_lock is held while setting and clearing the 'probed' flag this is sufficient to guarantee the safety of callback functions. Removing the mutex from around the call to probe() means that it is now possible for a bus event (PING response) to be handled in parallel with the probe(). But sdw_bus_probe() already has handling for this by calling the device update_status() after the probe() has completed. Example lockdep assert: [ 46.098514] ====================================================== [ 46.104736] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 46.110961] 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 Tainted: G E [ 46.116842] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 46.123063] mpg123/1130 is trying to acquire lock: [ 46.127883] ffff8b445031fb80 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.137225] but task is already holding lock: [ 46.143074] ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830 [ 46.151536] which lock already depends on the new lock.[ 46.159732] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 46.167231] -> #4 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.173428] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.177542] snd_soc_dpcm_runtime_update+0x2e/0x100 [ 46.182958] snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double+0x1c2/0x200 [ 46.188548] snd_ctl_elem_write+0x10c/0x1d0 [ 46.193268] snd_ctl_ioctl+0x126/0x850 [ 46.197556] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 [ 46.201845] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.205959] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.211553] -> #3 (&card->controls_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}: [ 46.218188] down_write+0x2b/0xd0 [ 46.222038] snd_ctl_add_replace+0x39/0xb0 [ 46.226672] snd_soc_add_controls+0x53/0x80 [ 46.231393] soc_probe_component+0x1e4/0x2a0 [ 46.236202] snd_soc_bind_card+0x51a/0xc80 [ 46.240836] devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90 [ 46.246079] mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw] [ 46.251500] platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0 [ 46.255700] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.259814] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.264710] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.269347] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.273721] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.278098] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.282473] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.286759] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.291136] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.295422] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.300321] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.304434] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.310027] -> #2 (&card->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.315883] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.320000] snd_soc_bind_card+0x3e/0xc80 [ 46.324551] devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x43/0x90 [ 46.329798] mc_probe+0x982/0xfe0 [snd_soc_sof_sdw] [ 46.335219] platform_probe+0x3c/0xa0 [ 46.339420] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.343532] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.348430] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.353065] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.357437] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.361812] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.366716] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.371528] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.376424] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.381239] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.386665] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.391299] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.397416] -> #1 (client_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.404307] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.408941] snd_soc_add_component+0x24/0x2c0 [ 46.414345] devm_snd_soc_register_component+0x54/0xa0 [ 46.420522] cs35l56_common_probe+0x280/0x370 [snd_soc_cs35l56] [ 46.427487] cs35l56_sdw_probe+0xf4/0x170 [snd_soc_cs35l56_sdw] [ 46.434442] sdw_drv_probe+0x80/0x1a0 [ 46.439136] really_probe+0xde/0x390 [ 46.443738] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x180 [ 46.449120] driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x90 [ 46.454247] __driver_attach+0x9f/0x1f0 [ 46.459106] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc0 [ 46.463971] bus_add_driver+0x1ac/0x200 [ 46.468825] driver_register+0x8f/0xf0 [ 46.473592] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x310 [ 46.478441] do_init_module+0x4c/0x1f0 [ 46.483202] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb4/0x130 [ 46.488572] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.493158] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.499229] -> #0 (&slave->sdw_dev_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 46.506737] __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0 [ 46.511765] lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300 [ 46.516360] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.520949] sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.526409] sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0 [ 46.531783] intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0 [ 46.537155] __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120 [ 46.541919] rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70 [ 46.546422] rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0 [ 46.550920] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80 [ 46.556024] snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0 [ 46.562611] __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520 [ 46.567375] dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210 [ 46.572661] dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830 [ 46.577597] snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0 [ 46.583145] snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200 [ 46.588341] snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80 [ 46.593625] chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250 [ 46.598129] do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430 [ 46.602981] path_openat+0x75e/0xa80 [ 46.607575] do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160 [ 46.612162] do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160 [ 46.616922] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 46.621767] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.626352] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.632414] other info that might help us debug this:[ 46.641862] Chain exists of: &slave->sdw_dev_lock --> &card->controls_rwsem --> &card->pcm_mutex[ 46.655145] Possible unsafe locking scenario:[ 46.662048] CPU0 CPU1 [ 46.667080] ---- ---- [ 46.672108] lock(&card->pcm_mutex); [ 46.676267] lock(&card->controls_rwsem); [ 46.683382] lock(&card->pcm_mutex); [ 46.690063] lock(&slave->sdw_dev_lock); [ 46.694574] *** DEADLOCK ***[ 46.701942] 2 locks held by mpg123/1130: [ 46.706356] #0: ffff8b4457b22b90 (&pcm->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xc9/0x200 [ 46.715999] #1: ffffffffc1455310 (&card->pcm_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dpcm_fe_dai_open+0x49/0x830 [ 46.725390] stack backtrace: [ 46.730752] CPU: 0 PID: 1130 Comm: mpg123 Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc4-jamerson #1 [ 46.739703] Hardware name: AAEON UP-WHL01/UP-WHL01, BIOS UPW1AM19 11/10/2020 [ 46.747270] Call Trace: [ 46.750239] <TASK> [ 46.752857] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x73 [ 46.757045] check_noncircular+0x102/0x120 [ 46.761664] __lock_acquire+0x1121/0x1df0 [ 46.766197] lock_acquire+0xd5/0x300 [ 46.770292] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.775432] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140 [ 46.780143] __mutex_lock+0x94/0x920 [ 46.784241] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.789387] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 46.793750] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.798894] ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0 [ 46.803262] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x47/0x250 [ 46.808315] ? sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.813456] sdw_update_slave_status+0x26/0x70 [ 46.818422] sdw_clear_slave_status+0xd8/0xe0 [ 46.823302] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.828706] intel_resume_runtime+0x139/0x2a0 [ 46.833583] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [ 46.838462] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.843866] __rpm_callback+0x41/0x120 [ 46.848142] ? pm_generic_runtime_suspend+0x30/0x30 [ 46.853550] rpm_callback+0x5d/0x70 [ 46.857568] rpm_resume+0x531/0x7e0 [ 46.861578] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x62/0x70 [ 46.866634] __pm_runtime_resume+0x4a/0x80 [ 46.871258] snd_soc_pcm_component_pm_runtime_get+0x2f/0xc0 [ 46.877358] __soc_pcm_open+0x62/0x520 [ 46.881634] ? dpcm_add_paths.isra.0+0x35d/0x4c0 [ 46.886784] dpcm_be_dai_startup+0x116/0x210 [ 46.891592] dpcm_fe_dai_open+0xf7/0x830 [ 46.896046] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x50 [ 46.900591] snd_pcm_open_substream+0x54a/0x8b0 [ 46.905658] snd_pcm_open.part.0+0xdc/0x200 [ 46.910376] ? wake_up_q+0x90/0x90 [ 46.914312] snd_pcm_playback_open+0x51/0x80 [ 46.919118] chrdev_open+0xc0/0x250 [ 46.923147] ? cdev_device_add+0x90/0x90 [ 46.927608] do_dentry_open+0x15f/0x430 [ 46.931976] path_openat+0x75e/0xa80 [ 46.936086] do_filp_open+0xb2/0x160 [ 46.940194] ? lock_release+0x147/0x2f0 [ 46.944563] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 [ 46.949101] do_sys_openat2+0x9a/0x160 [ 46.953377] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 46.957733] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 46.961829] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 46.967402] RIP: 0033:0x7fa6397ccd3b [ 46.971506] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4b 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 67 44 89 e2 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 91 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25 [ 46.991413] RSP: 002b:00007fff838e8990 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [ 46.999580] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000080802 RCX: 00007fa6397ccd3b [ 47.007311] RDX: 0000000000080802 RSI: 00007fff838e8b50 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c [ 47.015047] RBP: 00007fff838e8b50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000011 [ 47.022787] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000080802 [ 47.030539] R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fff838e8b50 [ 47.038289] </TASK> Signed-off-by: Richard Fitzgerald <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 13085e1 ] The following LOCKDEP was detected: Workqueue: events smc_lgr_free_work [smc] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.1.0-20221027.rc2.git8.56bc5b569087.300.fc36.s390x+debug #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/3:0/176251 is trying to acquire lock: 00000000f1467148 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_workqueue+0x7a/0x4f0 but task is already holding lock: 0000037fffe97dc8 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 ((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 __flush_work+0x76/0xf0 __cancel_work_timer+0x170/0x220 __smc_lgr_terminate.part.0+0x34/0x1c0 [smc] smc_connect_rdma+0x15e/0x418 [smc] __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc] smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc] __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0 __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370 __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208 system_call+0x82/0xb0 -> #3 (smc_client_lgr_pending){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 __mutex_lock+0x96/0x8e8 mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40 smc_connect_rdma+0xa4/0x418 [smc] __smc_connect+0x234/0x480 [smc] smc_connect+0x1d6/0x230 [smc] __sys_connect+0x90/0xc0 __do_sys_socketcall+0x186/0x370 __do_syscall+0x1da/0x208 system_call+0x82/0xb0 -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_SMC){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 lock_sock_nested+0x46/0xa8 smc_tx_work+0x34/0x50 [smc] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730 worker_thread+0x62/0x420 kthread+0x138/0x150 __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&smc->conn.tx_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 process_one_work+0x2bc/0x730 worker_thread+0x62/0x420 kthread+0x138/0x150 __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 -> #0 ((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88 validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20 __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0 drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158 destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8 smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730 worker_thread+0x62/0x420 kthread+0x138/0x150 __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2 --> smc_client_lgr_pending --> (work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&(&lgr->free_work)->work)); lock(smc_client_lgr_pending); lock((work_completion) (&(&lgr->free_work)->work)); lock((wq_completion)smc_tx_wq-00000000#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by kworker/3:0/176251: #0: 0000000080183548 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730 #1: 0000037fffe97dc8 ((work_completion) (&(&lgr->free_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x232/0x730 stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 176251 Comm: kworker/3:0 Not tainted Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 701 (z/VM 7.2.0) Call Trace: [<000000002983c3e4>] dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0x100 [<0000000028b477ae>] check_noncircular+0x13e/0x160 [<0000000028b48808>] check_prev_add+0xd8/0xe88 [<0000000028b49cc4>] validate_chain+0x70c/0xb20 [<0000000028b4bd26>] __lock_acquire+0x58e/0xbd8 [<0000000028b4cf6a>] lock_acquire.part.0+0xe2/0x248 [<0000000028b4d17c>] lock_acquire+0xac/0x1c8 [<0000000028addaaa>] __flush_workqueue+0xaa/0x4f0 [<0000000028addf9a>] drain_workqueue+0xaa/0x158 [<0000000028ae303c>] destroy_workqueue+0x44/0x2d8 [<000003ff8029af26>] smc_lgr_free+0x9e/0xf8 [smc] [<0000000028adf3d4>] process_one_work+0x30c/0x730 [<0000000028adf85a>] worker_thread+0x62/0x420 [<0000000028aeac50>] kthread+0x138/0x150 [<0000000028a63914>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 [<00000000298503da>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 INFO: lockdep is turned off. =================================================================== This deadlock occurs because cancel_delayed_work_sync() waits for the work(&lgr->free_work) to finish, while the &lgr->free_work waits for the work(lgr->tx_wq), which needs the sk_lock-AF_SMC, that is already used under the mutex_lock. The solution is to use cancel_delayed_work() instead, which kills off a pending work. Fixes: a52bcc9 ("net/smc: improve termination processing") Signed-off-by: Wenjia Zhang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jan Karcher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Karsten Graul <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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commit e021343 upstream. Histogram values can not be strings, stacktraces, graphs, symbols, syscalls, or grouped in buckets or log. Give an error if a value is set to do so. Note, the histogram code was not prepared to handle these modifiers for histograms and caused a bug. Mark Rutland reported: # echo 'p:copy_to_user __arch_copy_to_user n=$arg2' >> /sys/kernel/tracing/kprobe_events # echo 'hist:keys=n:vals=hitcount.buckets=8:sort=hitcount' > /sys/kernel/tracing/events/kprobes/copy_to_user/trigger # cat /sys/kernel/tracing/events/kprobes/copy_to_user/hist [ 143.694628] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 143.695190] Mem abort info: [ 143.695362] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 143.695604] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 143.695889] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 143.696077] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 143.696302] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 143.702381] Data abort info: [ 143.702614] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 143.702832] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 143.703087] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000448f9000 [ 143.703407] [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 143.704137] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 143.704714] Modules linked in: [ 143.705273] CPU: 0 PID: 133 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.2.0-00003-g6fc512c10a7c #3 [ 143.706138] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 143.706723] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 143.707120] pc : hist_field_name.part.0+0x14/0x140 [ 143.707504] lr : hist_field_name.part.0+0x104/0x140 [ 143.707774] sp : ffff800008333a30 [ 143.707952] x29: ffff800008333a30 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: 0000000000400cc0 [ 143.708429] x26: ffffd7a653b20260 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff10d303ee5800 [ 143.708776] x23: ffffd7a6539b27b0 x22: ffff10d303fb8c00 x21: 0000000000000001 [ 143.709127] x20: ffff10d303ec2000 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 143.709478] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 143.709824] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 203a6f666e692072 x12: 6567676972742023 [ 143.710179] x11: 0a230a6d6172676f x10: 000000000000002c x9 : ffffd7a6521e018c [ 143.710584] x8 : 000000000000002c x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 000000000000002c [ 143.710915] x5 : ffff10d303b0103e x4 : ffffd7a653b20261 x3 : 000000000000003d [ 143.711239] x2 : 0000000000020001 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 143.711746] Call trace: [ 143.712115] hist_field_name.part.0+0x14/0x140 [ 143.712642] hist_field_name.part.0+0x104/0x140 [ 143.712925] hist_field_print+0x28/0x140 [ 143.713125] event_hist_trigger_print+0x174/0x4d0 [ 143.713348] hist_show+0xf8/0x980 [ 143.713521] seq_read_iter+0x1bc/0x4b0 [ 143.713711] seq_read+0x8c/0xc4 [ 143.713876] vfs_read+0xc8/0x2a4 [ 143.714043] ksys_read+0x70/0xfc [ 143.714218] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30 [ 143.714400] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120 [ 143.714587] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x4c/0x100 [ 143.714807] do_el0_svc+0x44/0xd0 [ 143.714970] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84 [ 143.715134] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140 [ 143.715334] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 143.715742] Code: a9bd7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 aa0003f3 (f9400000) [ 143.716510] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Segmentation fault Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Fixes: c6afad4 ("tracing: Add hist trigger 'sym' and 'sym-offset' modifiers") Reported-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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commit 0b83c86 upstream. The function blk_revalidate_disk_zones() calls the function disk_update_zone_resources() after freezing the device queue. In turn, disk_update_zone_resources() calls queue_limits_start_update() which takes a queue limits mutex lock, resulting in the ordering: q->q_usage_counter check -> q->limits_lock. However, the usual ordering is to always take a queue limit lock before freezing the queue to commit the limits updates, e.g., the code pattern: lim = queue_limits_start_update(q); ... blk_mq_freeze_queue(q); ret = queue_limits_commit_update(q, &lim); blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(q); Thus, blk_revalidate_disk_zones() introduces a potential circular locking dependency deadlock that lockdep sometimes catches with the splat: [ 51.934109] ====================================================== [ 51.935916] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 51.937561] 6.12.0+ #2107 Not tainted [ 51.938648] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 51.940351] kworker/u16:4/157 is trying to acquire lock: [ 51.941805] ffff9fff0aa0bea8 (&q->limits_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: disk_update_zone_resources+0x86/0x170 [ 51.944314] but task is already holding lock: [ 51.945688] ffff9fff0aa0b890 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}, at: blk_revalidate_disk_zones+0x15f/0x340 [ 51.948527] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 51.951296] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 51.953708] -> #1 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3){++++}-{0:0}: [ 51.956131] blk_queue_enter+0x1c9/0x1e0 [ 51.957290] blk_mq_alloc_request+0x187/0x2a0 [ 51.958365] scsi_execute_cmd+0x78/0x490 [scsi_mod] [ 51.959514] read_capacity_16+0x111/0x410 [sd_mod] [ 51.960693] sd_revalidate_disk.isra.0+0x872/0x3240 [sd_mod] [ 51.962004] sd_probe+0x2d7/0x520 [sd_mod] [ 51.962993] really_probe+0xd5/0x330 [ 51.963898] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 51.964925] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 51.965916] __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xe0 [ 51.967017] async_run_entry_fn+0x2e/0x140 [ 51.968004] process_one_work+0x21f/0x5a0 [ 51.968987] worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0 [ 51.969868] kthread+0xe0/0x110 [ 51.970377] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 [ 51.970983] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 51.971587] -> #0 (&q->limits_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 51.972479] __lock_acquire+0x1337/0x2130 [ 51.973133] lock_acquire+0xc5/0x2d0 [ 51.973691] __mutex_lock+0xda/0xcf0 [ 51.974300] disk_update_zone_resources+0x86/0x170 [ 51.975032] blk_revalidate_disk_zones+0x16c/0x340 [ 51.975740] sd_zbc_revalidate_zones+0x73/0x160 [sd_mod] [ 51.976524] sd_revalidate_disk.isra.0+0x465/0x3240 [sd_mod] [ 51.977824] sd_probe+0x2d7/0x520 [sd_mod] [ 51.978917] really_probe+0xd5/0x330 [ 51.979915] __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110 [ 51.981047] driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0 [ 51.982143] __driver_attach_async_helper+0x60/0xe0 [ 51.983282] async_run_entry_fn+0x2e/0x140 [ 51.984319] process_one_work+0x21f/0x5a0 [ 51.985873] worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0 [ 51.987289] kthread+0xe0/0x110 [ 51.988546] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 [ 51.989926] ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 [ 51.991376] other info that might help us debug this: [ 51.994127] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 51.995651] CPU0 CPU1 [ 51.996694] ---- ---- [ 51.997716] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); [ 51.998817] lock(&q->limits_lock); [ 52.000043] lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)#3); [ 52.001638] lock(&q->limits_lock); [ 52.002485] *** DEADLOCK *** Prevent this issue by moving the calls to blk_mq_freeze_queue() and blk_mq_unfreeze_queue() around the call to queue_limits_commit_update() in disk_update_zone_resources(). In case of revalidation failure, the call to disk_free_zone_resources() in blk_revalidate_disk_zones() is still done with the queue frozen as before. Fixes: 843283e ("block: Fake max open zones limit when there is no limit") Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 5858b68 ] Kernel will hang on destroy admin_q while we create ctrl failed, such as following calltrace: PID: 23644 TASK: ff2d52b40f439fc0 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "nvme" #0 [ff61d23de260fb78] __schedule at ffffffff8323bc15 #1 [ff61d23de260fc08] schedule at ffffffff8323c014 #2 [ff61d23de260fc28] blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait at ffffffff82a3dba1 #3 [ff61d23de260fc78] blk_freeze_queue at ffffffff82a4113a #4 [ff61d23de260fc90] blk_cleanup_queue at ffffffff82a33006 #5 [ff61d23de260fcb0] nvme_rdma_destroy_admin_queue at ffffffffc12686ce #6 [ff61d23de260fcc8] nvme_rdma_setup_ctrl at ffffffffc1268ced #7 [ff61d23de260fd28] nvme_rdma_create_ctrl at ffffffffc126919b #8 [ff61d23de260fd68] nvmf_dev_write at ffffffffc024f362 #9 [ff61d23de260fe38] vfs_write at ffffffff827d5f25 RIP: 00007fda7891d574 RSP: 00007ffe2ef06958 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055e8122a4d90 RCX: 00007fda7891d574 RDX: 000000000000012b RSI: 000055e8122a4d90 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffe2ef079c0 R8: 000000000000012b R9: 000055e8122a4d90 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 R13: 000055e8122923c0 R14: 000000000000012b R15: 00007fda78a54500 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 CS: 0033 SS: 002b This due to we have quiesced admi_q before cancel requests, but forgot to unquiesce before destroy it, as a result we fail to drain the pending requests, and hang on blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait() forever. Here try to reuse nvme_rdma_teardown_admin_queue() to fix this issue and simplify the code. Fixes: 958dc1d ("nvme-rdma: add clean action for failed reconnection") Reported-by: Yingfu.zhou <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Chunguang.xu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yue.zhao <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 59458fa ] Ran Xiaokai reports that with a KCSAN-enabled PREEMPT_RT kernel, we can see splats like: | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/1 | preempt_count: 10002, expected: 0 | RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 | no locks held by swapper/1/0. | irq event stamp: 156674 | hardirqs last enabled at (156673): [<ffffffff81130bd9>] do_idle+0x1f9/0x240 | hardirqs last disabled at (156674): [<ffffffff82254f84>] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x14/0xc0 | softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff81099f47>] copy_process+0xfc7/0x4b60 | softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 | Preemption disabled at: | [<ffffffff814a3e2a>] paint_ptr+0x2a/0x90 | CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 6.11.0+ #3 | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 | Call Trace: | <IRQ> | dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0 | dump_stack+0x1d/0x30 | __might_resched+0x1a2/0x270 | rt_spin_lock+0x68/0x170 | kcsan_skip_report_debugfs+0x43/0xe0 | print_report+0xb5/0x590 | kcsan_report_known_origin+0x1b1/0x1d0 | kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x348/0x650 | __tsan_unaligned_write1+0x16d/0x1d0 | hrtimer_interrupt+0x3d6/0x430 | __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xe8/0x3a0 | sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0 | </IRQ> On a detected data race, KCSAN's reporting logic checks if it should filter the report. That list is protected by the report_filterlist_lock *non-raw* spinlock which may sleep on RT kernels. Since KCSAN may report data races in any context, convert it to a raw_spinlock. This requires being careful about when to allocate memory for the filter list itself which can be done via KCSAN's debugfs interface. Concurrent modification of the filter list via debugfs should be rare: the chosen strategy is to optimistically pre-allocate memory before the critical section and discard if unused. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reported-by: Ran Xiaokai <[email protected]> Tested-by: Ran Xiaokai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…dfl() [ Upstream commit f39489f ] When getting an LLC CPU mask in the default CPU selection policy, scx_select_cpu_dfl(), a pointer to the sched_domain is dereferenced using rcu_read_lock() without holding rcu_read_lock(). Such an unprotected dereference often causes the following warning and can cause an invalid memory access in the worst case. Therefore, protect dereference of a sched_domain pointer using a pair of rcu_read_lock() and unlock(). [ 20.996135] ============================= [ 20.996345] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [ 20.996563] 6.11.0-virtme #17 Tainted: G W [ 20.996576] ----------------------------- [ 20.996576] kernel/sched/ext.c:3323 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! [ 20.996576] [ 20.996576] other info that might help us debug this: [ 20.996576] [ 20.996576] [ 20.996576] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 [ 20.996576] 4 locks held by kworker/8:1/140: [ 20.996576] #0: ffff8b18c00dd348 ((wq_completion)pm){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4a0/0x590 [ 20.996576] #1: ffffb3da01f67e58 ((work_completion)(&dev->power.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1ba/0x590 [ 20.996576] #2: ffffffffa316f9f0 (&rcu_state.gp_wq){..-.}-{2:2}, at: swake_up_one+0x15/0x60 [ 20.996576] #3: ffff8b1880398a60 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: try_to_wake_up+0x59/0x7d0 [ 20.996576] [ 20.996576] stack backtrace: [ 20.996576] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 140 Comm: kworker/8:1 Tainted: G W 6.11.0-virtme #17 [ 20.996576] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 20.996576] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 20.996576] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work [ 20.996576] Sched_ext: simple (disabling+all), task: runnable_at=-6ms [ 20.996576] Call Trace: [ 20.996576] <IRQ> [ 20.996576] dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0 [ 20.996576] lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4e/0x96 [ 20.996576] scx_select_cpu_dfl+0x234/0x260 [ 20.996576] select_task_rq_scx+0xfb/0x190 [ 20.996576] select_task_rq+0x47/0x110 [ 20.996576] try_to_wake_up+0x110/0x7d0 [ 20.996576] swake_up_one+0x39/0x60 [ 20.996576] rcu_core+0xb08/0xe50 [ 20.996576] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 20.996576] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70 [ 20.996576] handle_softirqs+0xd3/0x410 [ 20.996576] irq_exit_rcu+0x78/0xa0 [ 20.996576] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x73/0x80 [ 20.996576] </IRQ> [ 20.996576] <TASK> [ 20.996576] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 [ 20.996576] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x70 [ 20.996576] Code: f5 53 48 8b 74 24 10 48 89 fb 48 83 c7 18 e8 11 b4 36 ff 48 89 df e8 99 0d 37 ff f7 c5 00 02 00 00 75 17 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 2b <65> ff 0d 5b 55 3c 5e 74 16 5b 5d e9 95 8e 28 00 e8 a5 ee 44 ff 9c [ 20.996576] RSP: 0018:ffffb3da01f67d20 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 20.996576] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffffffffa4640220 RCX: 0000000000000040 [ 20.996576] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffffa1c7b27b [ 20.996576] RBP: 0000000000000246 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 20.996576] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000021c R12: 0000000000000246 [ 20.996576] R13: ffff8b1881363958 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8b1881363800 [ 20.996576] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4b/0x70 [ 20.996576] serial_port_runtime_resume+0xd4/0x1a0 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] __rpm_callback+0x44/0x170 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] rpm_callback+0x55/0x60 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_serial_port_runtime_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] rpm_resume+0x582/0x7b0 [ 20.996576] pm_runtime_work+0x7c/0xb0 [ 20.996576] process_one_work+0x1fb/0x590 [ 20.996576] worker_thread+0x18e/0x350 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] kthread+0xe2/0x110 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50 [ 20.996576] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 20.996576] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 20.996576] </TASK> [ 21.056592] sched_ext: BPF scheduler "simple" disabled (unregistered from user space) Signed-off-by: Changwoo Min <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 88a6e2f ] Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one. The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host() that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in machine__new_host(). Before the patch: (gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1 <SNIP> Summary of events: gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ pselect6 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ poll 1 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00% <SNIP> Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478 478 if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL) (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478 #1 0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673 #2 0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708 #3 0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747 #4 0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456 #5 0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487 #6 0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351 #7 0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404 #8 0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448 #9 0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560 (gdb) After: root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1 <SNIP> pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ epoll_wait 188 0 983.428 0.000 5.231 15.595 8.68% ioctl 94 0 0.811 0.004 0.009 0.016 2.82% read 188 0 0.322 0.001 0.002 0.006 5.15% write 141 0 0.280 0.001 0.002 0.018 8.39% timerfd_settime 94 0 0.138 0.001 0.001 0.007 6.47% gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9% syscall calls errors total min avg max stddev (msec) (msec) (msec) (msec) (%) --------------- -------- ------ -------- --------- --------- --------- ------ poll 222 0 959.577 0.000 4.322 21.414 11.40% recvmsg 150 0 0.539 0.001 0.004 0.013 5.12% write 300 0 0.442 0.001 0.001 0.007 3.29% read 150 0 0.183 0.001 0.001 0.009 5.53% getpid 102 0 0.101 0.000 0.001 0.008 7.82% root@number:~# Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()") Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]> Tested-by: Michael Petlan <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1 Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 168e283 ] This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock. [ 75.307983] ====================================================== [ 75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ #22 Not tainted [ 75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock: [ 75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO) at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308021] but task is already holding lock: [ 75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock) at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308053] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 75.308054] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 75.308055] -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 75.308057] __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50 [ 75.308061] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 75.308063] iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308085] __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60 [ 75.308088] __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90 [ 75.308090] x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0 [ 75.308092] do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150 [ 75.308095] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 75.308098] -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 75.308100] __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0 [ 75.308103] lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300 [ 75.308105] lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90 [ 75.308107] iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth] [ 75.308128] hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth] [ 75.308155] hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308180] hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth] [ 75.308206] hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308230] hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth] [ 75.308254] process_one_work+0x212/0x740 [ 75.308256] worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0 [ 75.308258] kthread+0xe4/0x120 [ 75.308259] ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70 [ 75.308261] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 75.308263] other info that might help us debug this: [ 75.308264] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 75.308264] CPU0 CPU1 [ 75.308265] ---- ---- [ 75.308265] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308267] lock(sk_lock- AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308268] lock(&hdev->lock); [ 75.308269] lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO); [ 75.308270] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623: [ 75.308272] #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740 [ 75.308276] #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)), at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740 [ 75.308280] #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3} at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth] [ 75.308304] #3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth] Fixes: 02171da ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add hcon for listening bis sk") Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…s_lock [ Upstream commit be26ba9 ] For storing a value to a queue attribute, the queue_attr_store function first freezes the queue (->q_usage_counter(io)) and then acquire ->sysfs_lock. This seems not correct as the usual ordering should be to acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. This incorrect ordering causes the following lockdep splat which we are able to reproduce always simply by accessing /sys/kernel/debug file using ls command: [ 57.597146] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 57.597154] 6.12.0-10553-gb86545e02e8c #20 Tainted: G W [ 57.597162] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 57.597168] ls/4605 is trying to acquire lock: [ 57.597176] c00000003eb56710 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __might_fault+0x58/0xc0 [ 57.597200] but task is already holding lock: [ 57.597207] c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 [ 57.597226] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 57.597233] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 57.597241] -> #5 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597255] down_write+0x6c/0x18c [ 57.597264] start_creating+0xb4/0x24c [ 57.597274] debugfs_create_dir+0x2c/0x1e8 [ 57.597283] blk_register_queue+0xec/0x294 [ 57.597292] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597302] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597309] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597317] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597326] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597334] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597342] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597350] -> #4 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597362] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597370] blk_register_queue+0xd4/0x294 [ 57.597379] add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548 [ 57.597388] brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338 [ 57.597395] brd_init+0x100/0x178 [ 57.597402] do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4 [ 57.597410] kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0 [ 57.597418] kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc [ 57.597426] ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c [ 57.597434] -> #3 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: [ 57.597446] __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0 [ 57.597454] queue_attr_store+0x9c/0x110 [ 57.597462] sysfs_kf_write+0x70/0xb0 [ 57.597471] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x2ac [ 57.597480] vfs_write+0x3dc/0x6e8 [ 57.597488] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597495] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597504] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597516] -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)#21){++++}-{0:0}: [ 57.597530] __submit_bio+0x5ec/0x828 [ 57.597538] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e4/0x4f0 [ 57.597547] iomap_readahead+0x2a0/0x448 [ 57.597556] xfs_vm_readahead+0x28/0x3c [ 57.597564] read_pages+0x88/0x41c [ 57.597571] page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ac/0x2d8 [ 57.597580] filemap_get_pages+0x188/0x984 [ 57.597588] filemap_read+0x13c/0x4bc [ 57.597596] xfs_file_buffered_read+0x88/0x17c [ 57.597605] xfs_file_read_iter+0xac/0x158 [ 57.597614] vfs_read+0x2d4/0x3b4 [ 57.597622] ksys_read+0x84/0x144 [ 57.597629] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597637] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597647] -> #1 (mapping.invalidate_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597661] down_read+0x6c/0x220 [ 57.597669] filemap_fault+0x870/0x100c [ 57.597677] xfs_filemap_fault+0xc4/0x18c [ 57.597684] __do_fault+0x64/0x164 [ 57.597693] __handle_mm_fault+0x1274/0x1dac [ 57.597702] handle_mm_fault+0x248/0x484 [ 57.597711] ___do_page_fault+0x428/0xc0c [ 57.597719] hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x68 [ 57.597727] do_hash_fault+0x90/0x35c [ 57.597736] data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220 [ 57.597745] _copy_from_user+0xf8/0x19c [ 57.597754] sel_write_load+0x178/0xd54 [ 57.597762] vfs_write+0x108/0x6e8 [ 57.597769] ksys_write+0x84/0x140 [ 57.597777] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597785] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597794] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}: [ 57.597806] __lock_acquire+0x17cc/0x2330 [ 57.597814] lock_acquire+0x138/0x400 [ 57.597822] __might_fault+0x7c/0xc0 [ 57.597830] filldir64+0xe8/0x390 [ 57.597839] dcache_readdir+0x80/0x2d4 [ 57.597846] iterate_dir+0xd8/0x1d4 [ 57.597855] sys_getdents64+0x88/0x2d4 [ 57.597864] system_call_exception+0x130/0x360 [ 57.597872] system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 [ 57.597881] other info that might help us debug this: [ 57.597888] Chain exists of: &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->debugfs_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3 [ 57.597905] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 57.597911] CPU0 CPU1 [ 57.597917] ---- ---- [ 57.597922] rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597932] lock(&q->debugfs_mutex); [ 57.597940] lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3); [ 57.597950] rlock(&mm->mmap_lock); [ 57.597958] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 57.597965] 2 locks held by ls/4605: [ 57.597971] #0: c0000000137c12f8 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0xcc/0x154 [ 57.597989] #1: c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4 Prevent the above lockdep warning by acquiring ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue while storing a queue attribute in queue_attr_store function. Later, we also found[1] another function __blk_mq_update_nr_ hw_queues where we first freeze queue and then acquire the ->sysfs_lock. So we've also updated lock ordering in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues function and ensured that in all code paths we follow the correct lock ordering i.e. acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFj5m9Ke8+EHKQBs_Nk6hqd=LGXtk4mUxZUN5==ZcCjnZSBwHw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: af28141 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store") Tested-by: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 4d94f05 ] This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs like the bellow: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2 preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070: #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline] #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 #2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915 CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline] __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline] hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline] hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569 hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243 </TASK> Reported-by: [email protected] Tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614 Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…nt message commit cddc76b upstream. Address a bug in the kernel that triggers a "sleeping function called from invalid context" warning when /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak is printed under specific conditions: - CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y - Set SELinux as the LSM for the system - Set kptr_restrict to 1 - kmemleak buffer contains at least one item BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 136, name: cat preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2 6 locks held by cat/136: #0: ffff32e64bcbf950 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read_iter+0xb8/0xe30 #1: ffffafe6aaa9dea0 (scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kmemleak_seq_start+0x34/0x128 #3: ffff32e6546b1cd0 (&object->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0 #4: ffffafe6aa8d8560 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x8/0x1b0 #5: ffffafe6aabbc0f8 (notif_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: avc_compute_av+0xc4/0x3d0 irq event stamp: 136660 hardirqs last enabled at (136659): [<ffffafe6a80fd7a0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0xd8 hardirqs last disabled at (136660): [<ffffafe6a80fd85c>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8c/0xb0 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffafe6a5d50b28>] copy_process+0x11d8/0x3df8 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 Preemption disabled at: [<ffffafe6a6598a4c>] kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 136 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rt7+ torvalds#34 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x198 dump_stack+0x18/0x20 rt_spin_lock+0x8c/0x1a8 avc_perm_nonode+0xa0/0x150 cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x118/0x218 selinux_capable+0x50/0x80 security_capable+0x7c/0xd0 has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x94/0x1b0 has_capability_noaudit+0x20/0x30 restricted_pointer+0x21c/0x4b0 pointer+0x298/0x760 vsnprintf+0x330/0xf70 seq_printf+0x178/0x218 print_unreferenced+0x1a4/0x2d0 kmemleak_seq_show+0xd0/0x1e0 seq_read_iter+0x354/0xe30 seq_read+0x250/0x378 full_proxy_read+0xd8/0x148 vfs_read+0x190/0x918 ksys_read+0xf0/0x1e0 __arm64_sys_read+0x70/0xa8 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xd4/0x1d8 el0_svc+0x50/0x158 el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180 %pS and %pK, in the same back trace line, are redundant, and %pS can void %pK service in certain contexts. %pS alone already provides the necessary information, and if it cannot resolve the symbol, it falls back to printing the raw address voiding the original intent behind the %pK. Additionally, %pK requires a privilege check CAP_SYSLOG enforced through the LSM, which can trigger a "sleeping function called from invalid context" warning under RT_PREEMPT kernels when the check occurs in an atomic context. This issue may also affect other LSMs. This change avoids the unnecessary privilege check and resolves the sleeping function warning without any loss of information. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 3a6f33d ("mm/kmemleak: use %pK to display kernel pointers in backtrace") Signed-off-by: Alessandro Carminati <[email protected]> Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]> Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]> Cc: Clément Léger <[email protected]> Cc: Alessandro Carminati <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Chanudet <[email protected]> Cc: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]> Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]> Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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…le_direct_reclaim() commit 6aaced5 upstream. The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [[email protected]: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now) raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking: ============================= [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f torvalds#29 Not tainted ----------------------------- kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock: ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 other info that might help us debug this: context-{5:5} 6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094: #0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0 #1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0 #2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180 #3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180 #4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 #5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38 stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f torvalds#29 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work Call trace: show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C) __dump_stack+0x24/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80 dump_stack+0x14/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8 lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0 eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180 io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108 io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430 __io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270 io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288 io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180 io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388 io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550 process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0 worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80 kthread+0x24c/0x300 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the raw timeout spinlock. Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock, split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock. Reported-by: [email protected] Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock") Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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…le_direct_reclaim() The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false. #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4 At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones: NODE: 4 ZONE: 0 ADDR: ffff00817fffe540 NAME: "DMA32" SIZE: 20480 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 359 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 NODE: 4 ZONE: 1 ADDR: ffff00817fffec00 NAME: "Normal" SIZE: 8454144 PRESENT: 98304 MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264 VM_STAT: NR_FREE_PAGES: 146 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3 NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735 NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78 NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0 NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0 NR_MLOCK: 0 NR_BOUNCE: 0 NR_ZSPAGES: 0 NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0 In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages() based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero. Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/ active anonymous pages is skipped. crash> p nr_swap_pages nr_swap_pages = $1937 = { counter = 0 } As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark. The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented. crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures $1935 = 0x0 This is because the node deemed balanced. The node balancing logic in balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively. If one or more zones (e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the entire node is deemed balanced. This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain under significant pressure. The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages). This change prevents zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being mistakenly deemed unreclaimable. By doing so, the patch ensures proper node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL, and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false. The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL. This issue arises from zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file- backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient free pages to be skipped. The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones. Consequently, pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim(). This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages (NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist. This ensures zones with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and reclaim behavior. [[email protected]: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations") Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]> Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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…nt message
Address a bug in the kernel that triggers a "sleeping function called from
invalid context" warning when /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak is printed under
specific conditions:
- CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y
- Set SELinux as the LSM for the system
- Set kptr_restrict to 1
- kmemleak buffer contains at least one item
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 136, name: cat
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 2
6 locks held by cat/136:
#0: ffff32e64bcbf950 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read_iter+0xb8/0xe30
#1: ffffafe6aaa9dea0 (scan_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kmemleak_seq_start+0x34/0x128
#3: ffff32e6546b1cd0 (&object->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0
#4: ffffafe6aa8d8560 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x8/0x1b0
#5: ffffafe6aabbc0f8 (notif_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: avc_compute_av+0xc4/0x3d0
irq event stamp: 136660
hardirqs last enabled at (136659): [<ffffafe6a80fd7a0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa8/0xd8
hardirqs last disabled at (136660): [<ffffafe6a80fd85c>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8c/0xb0
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffafe6a5d50b28>] copy_process+0x11d8/0x3df8
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffafe6a6598a4c>] kmemleak_seq_show+0x3c/0x1e0
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 136 Comm: cat Tainted: G E 6.11.0-rt7+ torvalds#34
Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
show_stack+0x1c/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x198
dump_stack+0x18/0x20
rt_spin_lock+0x8c/0x1a8
avc_perm_nonode+0xa0/0x150
cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x118/0x218
selinux_capable+0x50/0x80
security_capable+0x7c/0xd0
has_ns_capability_noaudit+0x94/0x1b0
has_capability_noaudit+0x20/0x30
restricted_pointer+0x21c/0x4b0
pointer+0x298/0x760
vsnprintf+0x330/0xf70
seq_printf+0x178/0x218
print_unreferenced+0x1a4/0x2d0
kmemleak_seq_show+0xd0/0x1e0
seq_read_iter+0x354/0xe30
seq_read+0x250/0x378
full_proxy_read+0xd8/0x148
vfs_read+0x190/0x918
ksys_read+0xf0/0x1e0
__arm64_sys_read+0x70/0xa8
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xd4/0x1d8
el0_svc+0x50/0x158
el0t_64_sync+0x17c/0x180
%pS and %pK, in the same back trace line, are redundant, and %pS can void
%pK service in certain contexts.
%pS alone already provides the necessary information, and if it cannot
resolve the symbol, it falls back to printing the raw address voiding
the original intent behind the %pK.
Additionally, %pK requires a privilege check CAP_SYSLOG enforced through
the LSM, which can trigger a "sleeping function called from invalid
context" warning under RT_PREEMPT kernels when the check occurs in an
atomic context. This issue may also affect other LSMs.
This change avoids the unnecessary privilege check and resolves the
sleeping function warning without any loss of information.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 3a6f33d ("mm/kmemleak: use %pK to display kernel pointers in backtrace")
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Carminati <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Clément Léger <[email protected]>
Cc: Alessandro Carminati <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Chanudet <[email protected]>
Cc: Gabriele Paoloni <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
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If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says, it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the _early() suffix. Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging: xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01 xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged. ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G U W 6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3 Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022 RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe] This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a signature failure. There will still be an extra message, xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100 but that's better than a NULL ptr deref. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/3956 Fixes: c9474b7 ("drm/xe: Wedge the entire device") Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 5001ef3) Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]>
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We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system. The reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet order problem. We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the mctp_i3c_read function. According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be discarded and wait for the next SOM. For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM. Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the mctp_i3c_read function. Before the modification, when a command requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an error usually occurs within 100 loops. After the mutex, it can go through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well. Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver") Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [[email protected]: dropped already answered question from changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 changes for 6.13, part #3 - Always check page state in hyp_ack_unshare() - Align set_id_regs selftest with the fact that ASIDBITS field is RO - Various vPMU fixes for bugs that only affect nested virt
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[ Upstream commit 2d2d4f6 ] We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system. The reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet order problem. We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the mctp_i3c_read function. According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be discarded and wait for the next SOM. For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM. Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the mctp_i3c_read function. Before the modification, when a command requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an error usually occurs within 100 loops. After the mutex, it can go through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well. Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver") Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] [[email protected]: dropped already answered question from changelog] Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 9ab4981 ] If GuC fails to load, the driver wedges, but in the process it tries to do stuff that may not be initialized yet. This moves the xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_init() to be done earlier: as its own doc says, it's a software-only initialization and should had been named with the _early() suffix. Move it to be called by xe_gt_init_early(), so the locks and seqno are initialized, avoiding a NULL ptr deref when wedging: xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: load failed: status: Reset = 0, BootROM = 0x50, UKernel = 0x00, MIA = 0x00, Auth = 0x01 xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: firmware signature verification failed xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* CRITICAL: Xe has declared device 0000:03:00.0 as wedged. ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 3908 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G U W 6.13.0-rc4-xe+ #3 Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-S ADP-S DDR5 UDIMM CRB, BIOS ADLSFWI1.R00.3275.A00.2207010640 07/01/2022 RIP: 0010:xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_reset+0x75/0x110 [xe] This can be easily triggered by poking the GuC binary to force a signature failure. There will still be an extra message, xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] *ERROR* GT0: GuC mmio request 0x4100: no reply 0x4100 but that's better than a NULL ptr deref. Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/xe/kernel/-/issues/3956 Fixes: c9474b7 ("drm/xe: Wedge the entire device") Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <[email protected]> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 5001ef3) Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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irq_chip functions may be called in raw spinlock context. Therefore, we must also use a raw spinlock for our own internal locking. This fixes the following lockdep splat: [ 5.349336] ============================= [ 5.353349] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 5.357361] 6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69 Tainted: G W [ 5.363031] ----------------------------- [ 5.367045] kworker/u17:1/44 is trying to lock: [ 5.371587] ffffff88018b02c0 (&chip->gpio_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.380079] other info that might help us debug this: [ 5.385138] context-{5:5} [ 5.387762] 5 locks held by kworker/u17:1/44: [ 5.392123] #0: ffffff8800014958 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3204) [ 5.402260] #1: ffffffc082fcbdd8 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3205) [ 5.411528] #2: ffffff880172c900 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach (drivers/base/dd.c:1006) [ 5.419929] #3: ffffff88039c8268 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/internals.h:156 kernel/irq/manage.c:1596) [ 5.428331] #4: ffffff88039c80c8 (lock_class#2){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1614) [ 5.436472] stack backtrace: [ 5.439359] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 44 Comm: kworker/u17:1 Tainted: G W 6.13.0-rc5+ torvalds#69 [ 5.448690] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 5.451656] Hardware name: xlnx,zynqmp (DT) [ 5.455845] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 5.461699] Call trace: [ 5.464147] show_stack+0x18/0x24 C [ 5.467821] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) [ 5.471501] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) [ 5.474824] __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4828 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4898 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5176) [ 5.478758] lock_acquire (arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:467 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5814) [ 5.482429] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:111 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162) [ 5.486797] xgpio_irq_unmask (drivers/gpio/gpio-xilinx.c:433 (discriminator 8)) [ 5.490737] irq_enable (kernel/irq/internals.h:236 kernel/irq/chip.c:170 kernel/irq/chip.c:439 kernel/irq/chip.c:432 kernel/irq/chip.c:345) [ 5.494060] __irq_startup (kernel/irq/internals.h:241 kernel/irq/chip.c:180 kernel/irq/chip.c:250) [ 5.497645] irq_startup (kernel/irq/chip.c:270) [ 5.501143] __setup_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:1807) [ 5.504728] request_threaded_irq (kernel/irq/manage.c:2208) Fixes: a32c7ca ("gpio: gpio-xilinx: Add interrupt support") Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
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This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order. - The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`, leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is held, it can create a circular dependency. By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue: [ 606.297333] ====================================================== [ 606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 Tainted: G OE [ 606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock: [ 606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.297413] but task is already holding lock: [ 606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.297725] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 606.297738] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 606.297749] -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.297765] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.297776] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.297786] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298007] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298225] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.298412] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298603] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.298866] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.298880] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.298890] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.298899] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.298908] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.298919] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.298929] -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 606.298947] __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930 [ 606.298956] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 606.298966] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu] [ 606.299190] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.299199] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.299208] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.299217] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.299227] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.299236] -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: [ 606.299257] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.299267] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.299276] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.299286] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.299296] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299509] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.299723] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.299909] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300101] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300355] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.300369] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.300378] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.300387] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.300396] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.300406] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.300416] other info that might help us debug this: [ 606.300428] Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex [ 606.300458] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 606.300468] CPU0 CPU1 [ 606.300476] ---- ---- [ 606.300484] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300494] lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex); [ 606.300508] lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex); [ 606.300521] lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)); [ 606.300536] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825: [ 606.300555] #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680 [ 606.300577] #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680 [ 606.300600] #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.300837] #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301062] #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610 [ 606.301083] stack backtrace: [ 606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G OE 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof #19 [ 606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024 [ 606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 606.301140] Call Trace: [ 606.301146] <TASK> [ 606.301154] dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0 [ 606.301166] dump_stack+0x10/0x20 [ 606.301175] print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340 [ 606.301187] check_noncircular+0x157/0x170 [ 606.301197] ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490 [ 606.301213] __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810 [ 606.301230] lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300 [ 606.301239] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301250] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301261] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301274] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301284] __flush_work+0x250/0x610 [ 606.301293] ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610 [ 606.301305] ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10 [ 606.301318] ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90 [ 606.301331] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.301345] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80 [ 606.301356] amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.301661] amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302050] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 606.302069] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu] [ 606.302452] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu] [ 606.302862] ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched] [ 606.302890] amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu] [ 606.303366] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ 606.303388] process_one_work+0x21e/0x680 [ 606.303409] worker_thread+0x190/0x350 [ 606.303424] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303437] kthread+0xe7/0x120 [ 606.303449] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303463] ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 [ 606.303476] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 606.303489] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 606.303512] </TASK> v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex) - Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing `enforce_isolation_mutex`. - This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock. - The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward. - This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order. Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization") Cc: Christian König <[email protected]> Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd) Cc: [email protected]
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Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test.
The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead
to a deadlock.
However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its
parent lock are distinct ones.
The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object
class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev).
To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both
locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired.
[1]
raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.620270]
[ 213.620270] but task is already holding lock:
[ 213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.622045]
[ 213.622045] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 213.622778] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 213.622778]
[ 213.623465] CPU0
[ 213.623815] ----
[ 213.624148] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[ 213.624615] lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[ 213.625071]
[ 213.625071] *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 213.625071]
[ 213.625805] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[ 213.625805]
[ 213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118:
[ 213.627019] #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0},
at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.628088] #1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3},
at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.629094] #2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.630106] #3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.631185]
[ 213.631185] stack backtrace:
[ 213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted
6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 #1
[ 213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 213.633785] Call Trace:
[ 213.634099]
[ 213.634393] dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
[ 213.634806] print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0
[ 213.635265] __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40
[ 213.635712] lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[ 213.636120] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.636722] ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.637277] __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0
[ 213.637697] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.638305] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.638902] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 213.639400] ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.640016] mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[ 213.640615] set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.641144] ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40
[ 213.641586] mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib]
[ 213.642145] ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.642679] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0
[ib_uverbs]
[ 213.643426] ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80
[ 213.643878] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.644426] ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130
[ib_uverbs]
[ 213.645213] ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40
[ 213.645675] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[ 213.646101] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.646625] ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0
[ 213.647102] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770
[ 213.647586] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.648102] ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[ 213.648632] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0
[ 213.649060] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770
[ 213.649528] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[ 213.649947] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[ 213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b
[ 213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c
89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8
10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d
7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000010
[ 213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX:
00007fa179b0737b
[ 213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
0000000000000003
[ 213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09:
0000000000000002
[ 213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffd2e6d487c
[ 213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15:
00007ffd2e6d4f70
Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test")
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
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…nce changes [ Upstream commit e47f0a5 ] When starting/proceeding MCC, it will abort an ongoing hw scan process. In the proceeding cases, it unexpectedly tries to abort a non-exist hw scan process. Then, a trace shown at the bottom will happen. This problem is caused by a previous commit which changed some call sequence inside rtw89_hw_scan_complete() to fix some coex problems. These changes lead to our scanning flag was not cleared when proceeding MCC. To keep the fixes on coex, and resolve the problem here, re-consider the related call sequence. The known sequence requirements are listed below. * the old sequence: A. notify coex B. clear scanning flag C. proceed chanctx C-1. set channel C-2. proceed MCC (the problem: A needs to be after C-1) * the current sequence: C. proceed chanctx C-1. set channel C-2. proceed MCC A. notify coex B. clear scanning flag (the problem: C-2 needs to be after B) So, now let hw scan caller pass a callback to proceed chanctx if needed. Then, the new sequence will be like the below. C-1. set channel A. notify coex B. clear scanning flag C-2. proceed MCC The following is the kernel log for the problem in current sequence. rtw89_8852be 0000:04:00.0: rtw89_hw_scan_offload failed ret -110 ------------[ cut here ]------------ [...] CPU: 2 PID: 3991 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Tainted: G OE 6.6.17 #3 Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB3WW (2.73 ) 11/28/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound wiphy_work_cancel [cfg80211] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_sched_scan_stopped+0xaea/0xd80 [mac80211] Code: 9c 24 d0 11 00 00 49 39 dd 0f 85 46 ff ff ff 4c 89 e7 e8 09 2d RSP: 0018:ffffb27783643d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff8a2280964bc0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8a23df580900 RBP: ffffb27783643d88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000400 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000008268 R12: ffff8a23df580900 R13: ffff8a23df581b00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8a258e680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f26a0654000 CR3: 000000002ea2e002 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x68/0x70 ? ieee80211_sched_scan_stopped+0xaea/0xd80 [mac80211] ? __warn+0x8f/0x150 ? ieee80211_sched_scan_stopped+0xaea/0xd80 [mac80211] ? report_bug+0x1f5/0x200 ? handle_bug+0x46/0x80 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? ieee80211_sched_scan_stopped+0xaea/0xd80 [mac80211] ieee80211_scan_work+0x14a/0x650 [mac80211] ? __queue_work+0x10f/0x410 wiphy_work_cancel+0x2fb/0x310 [cfg80211] process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x390 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 worker_thread+0x15b/0x2d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x108/0x140 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: f16c40a ("wifi: rtw89: Fix TX fail with A2DP after scanning") Signed-off-by: Zong-Zhe Yang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit 600258d ] Packets handled by hardware have added secpath as a way to inform XFRM core code that this path was already handled. That secpath is not needed at all after policy is checked and it is removed later in the stack. However, in the case of IP forwarding is enabled (/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward), that secpath is not removed and packets which already were handled are reentered to the driver TX path with xfrm_offload set. The following kernel panic is observed in mlx5 in such case: mlx5_core 0000:04:00.0 enp4s0f0np0: Link up mlx5_core 0000:04:00.1 enp4s0f1np1: Link up Initializing XFRM netlink socket IPsec XFRM device driver BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1-alex #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? show_regs+0x63/0x70 ? __die_body+0x20/0x60 ? __die+0x2b/0x40 ? page_fault_oops+0x15c/0x550 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x3ed/0x870 ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x190 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 mlx5e_ipsec_handle_tx_skb+0xe7/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_xmit+0x58e/0x1980 [mlx5_core] ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x82/0x1d0 sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x390 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6d8/0xee0 ? __fib_lookup+0x6a/0xb0 ? internal_add_timer+0x48/0x70 ? mod_timer+0xe2/0x2b0 neigh_resolve_output+0x115/0x1b0 __neigh_update+0x26a/0xc50 neigh_update+0x14/0x20 arp_process+0x2cb/0x8e0 ? __napi_build_skb+0x5e/0x70 arp_rcv+0x11e/0x1c0 ? dev_gro_receive+0x574/0x820 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1cf/0x1f0 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x183/0x2a0 napi_complete_done+0x76/0x1c0 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x234/0x7a0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x2d/0x1f0 net_rx_action+0x1a6/0x370 ? atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x3b/0x50 ? irq_int_handler+0x15/0x20 [mlx5_core] handle_softirqs+0xb9/0x2f0 ? handle_irq_event+0x44/0x60 irq_exit_rcu+0xdb/0x100 common_interrupt+0x98/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40 RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10 Code: 09 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 0f 22 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 7f e9 36 00 fb 40 00 83 ff 07 77 21 89 ff ff 24 fd 88 3d a1 bd 0f 21 f8 RSP: 0018:ffffffffbe603de8 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000f92f46680 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: 00000000000518d4 RBP: ffffffffbe603df0 R08: 000000cd42e4dffb R09: ffffffffbe603d70 R10: 0000004d80d62680 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffbe60bf40 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffbe60aff8 ? default_idle+0x9/0x20 arch_cpu_idle+0x9/0x10 default_idle_call+0x29/0xf0 do_idle+0x1f2/0x240 cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30 rest_init+0xe7/0x100 start_kernel+0x76b/0xb90 x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0xc0/0x110 ? setup_ghcb+0xe/0x130 common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141 </TASK> Modules linked in: esp4_offload esp4 xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 xfrm_user xfrm_algo binfmt_misc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp kvm input_leds serio_raw qemu_fw_cfg sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx libcrc32c raid1 raid0 mlx5_core crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 ahci mlxfw i2c_i801 libahci i2c_mux i2c_smbus psample virtio_rng pci_hyperv_intf aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffb87380003800 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8df004e02600 RBX: ffffb873800038d8 RCX: 00000000ffff98cf RDX: ffff8df00733e108 RSI: ffff8df00521fb80 RDI: ffff8df001661f00 RBP: ffffb87380003850 R08: ffff8df013980000 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff8df001661f00 R13: ffff8df00521fb80 R14: ffff8df00733e108 R15: ffff8df011faf04e FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8df46b800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000106384000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: 0x3b800000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: 5958372 ("xfrm: add RX datapath protection for IPsec packet offload mode") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Cassen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit c7b87ce ] libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr", idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6 elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is found by UBsan. The error message: $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1 builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]' #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966 #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110 #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436 #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897 #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335 #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502 #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351 #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404 #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448 #9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556 #10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6) 0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1) = 1 Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint") Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.14, take #3 - Fix TCR_EL2 configuration to not use the ASID in TTBR1_EL2 and not mess-up T1SZ/PS by using the HCR_EL2.E2H==0 layout. - Bring back the VMID allocation to the vcpu_load phase, ensuring that we only setup VTTBR_EL2 once on VHE. This cures an ugly race that would lead to running with an unallocated VMID.
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Use raw_spinlock in order to fix spurious messages about invalid context
when spinlock debugging is enabled. The lock is only used to serialize
register access.
[ 4.239592] =============================
[ 4.239595] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[ 4.239599] 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f torvalds#35 Not tainted
[ 4.239603] -----------------------------
[ 4.239606] kworker/u8:5/76 is trying to lock:
[ 4.239609] ffff0000091898a0 (&p->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164
[ 4.239641] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 4.239643] context-{5:5}
[ 4.239646] 5 locks held by kworker/u8:5/76:
[ 4.239651] #0: ffff0000080fb148 ((wq_completion)async){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x190/0x62c
[ 4.250180] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@0/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value.
[ 4.254094] #1: ffff80008299bd80 ((work_completion)(&entry->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b8/0x62c
[ 4.254109] #2: ffff00000920c8f8
[ 4.258345] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'bitclock-master' with a value.
[ 4.264803] (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach_async_helper+0x3c/0xdc
[ 4.264820] #3: ffff00000a50ca40 (request_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq+0xa0/0x690
[ 4.264840] #4:
[ 4.268872] OF: /soc/sound@ec500000/ports/port@1/endpoint: Read of boolean property 'frame-master' with a value.
[ 4.273275] ffff00000a50c8c8 (lock_class){....}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq+0xc4/0x690
[ 4.296130] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac ee100000.mmc: mmc1 base at 0x00000000ee100000, max clock rate 200 MHz
[ 4.304082] stack backtrace:
[ 4.304086] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 76 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7-arm64-renesas-05496-gd088502a519f torvalds#35
[ 4.304092] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT)
[ 4.304097] Workqueue: async async_run_entry_fn
[ 4.304106] Call trace:
[ 4.304110] show_stack+0x14/0x20 (C)
[ 4.304122] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x90
[ 4.304131] dump_stack+0x14/0x1c
[ 4.304138] __lock_acquire+0xdfc/0x1584
[ 4.426274] lock_acquire+0x1c4/0x33c
[ 4.429942] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5c/0x80
[ 4.434307] gpio_rcar_config_interrupt_input_mode+0x34/0x164
[ 4.440061] gpio_rcar_irq_set_type+0xd4/0xd8
[ 4.444422] __irq_set_trigger+0x5c/0x178
[ 4.448435] __setup_irq+0x2e4/0x690
[ 4.452012] request_threaded_irq+0xc4/0x190
[ 4.456285] devm_request_threaded_irq+0x7c/0xf4
[ 4.459398] ata1: link resume succeeded after 1 retries
[ 4.460902] mmc_gpiod_request_cd_irq+0x68/0xe0
[ 4.470660] mmc_start_host+0x50/0xac
[ 4.474327] mmc_add_host+0x80/0xe4
[ 4.477817] tmio_mmc_host_probe+0x2b0/0x440
[ 4.482094] renesas_sdhi_probe+0x488/0x6f4
[ 4.486281] renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_probe+0x60/0x78
[ 4.491509] platform_probe+0x64/0xd8
[ 4.495178] really_probe+0xb8/0x2a8
[ 4.498756] __driver_probe_device+0x74/0x118
[ 4.503116] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154
[ 4.507303] __device_attach_driver+0xd4/0x160
[ 4.511750] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xe0
[ 4.515588] __device_attach_async_helper+0xb0/0xdc
[ 4.520470] async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0xd8
[ 4.524481] process_one_work+0x210/0x62c
[ 4.528494] worker_thread+0x1ac/0x340
[ 4.532245] kthread+0x10c/0x110
[ 4.535476] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <[email protected]>
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[ Upstream commit a216542 ] When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()). However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers"). So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search(). The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374 __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline] lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870 up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693 btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132 btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573 btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755 btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351 btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline] btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330 btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline] btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374 vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067 do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224 __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline] __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline] __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); lock(btrfs-tree-01/1); lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1); rlock(btrfs-tree-01); *** DEADLOCK *** 8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335: #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559 #1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183 #2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086 #3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659 #4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 #7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904 __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849 down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649 btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146 btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline] read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610 btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237 replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224 merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692 merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942 relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087 btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494 __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278 btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29 Code: ff ff c3 (...) RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29 RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88 </TASK> Reported-by: [email protected] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/[email protected]/ Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search") Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…rary mm [ Upstream commit dc9c516 ] Erhard reports the following KASAN hit on Talos II (power9) with kernel 6.13: [ 12.028126] ================================================================== [ 12.028198] BUG: KASAN: user-memory-access in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 12.028260] Write of size 8 at addr 0000187e458f2000 by task systemd/1 [ 12.028346] CPU: 87 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G T 6.13.0-P9-dirty #3 [ 12.028408] Tainted: [T]=RANDSTRUCT [ 12.028446] Hardware name: T2P9D01 REV 1.01 POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-bc106a0 PowerNV [ 12.028500] Call Trace: [ 12.028536] [c000000008dbf3b0] [c000000001656a48] dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x110 (unreliable) [ 12.028609] [c000000008dbf3f0] [c0000000006e2fc8] print_report+0x6b0/0x708 [ 12.028666] [c000000008dbf4e0] [c0000000006e2454] kasan_report+0x164/0x300 [ 12.028725] [c000000008dbf600] [c0000000006e54d4] kasan_check_range+0x314/0x370 [ 12.028784] [c000000008dbf640] [c0000000006e6310] __kasan_check_write+0x20/0x40 [ 12.028842] [c000000008dbf660] [c000000000578e8c] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 12.028902] [c000000008dbf6a0] [c0000000000acfe4] __patch_instructions+0x194/0x210 [ 12.028965] [c000000008dbf6e0] [c0000000000ade80] patch_instructions+0x150/0x590 [ 12.029026] [c000000008dbf7c0] [c0000000001159bc] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x6c/0xe0 [ 12.029085] [c000000008dbf800] [c000000000424250] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x40/0xc0 [ 12.029147] [c000000008dbf830] [c000000000115dec] bpf_int_jit_compile+0x3bc/0x930 [ 12.029206] [c000000008dbf990] [c000000000423720] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x1f0/0x280 [ 12.029266] [c000000008dbfa00] [c000000000434b18] bpf_prog_load+0xbb8/0x1370 [ 12.029324] [c000000008dbfb70] [c000000000436ebc] __sys_bpf+0x5ac/0x2e00 [ 12.029379] [c000000008dbfd00] [c00000000043a228] sys_bpf+0x28/0x40 [ 12.029435] [c000000008dbfd20] [c000000000038eb4] system_call_exception+0x334/0x610 [ 12.029497] [c000000008dbfe50] [c00000000000c270] system_call_vectored_common+0xf0/0x280 [ 12.029561] --- interrupt: 3000 at 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.029608] NIP: 00003fff82f5cfa8 LR: 00003fff82f5cfa8 CTR: 0000000000000000 [ 12.029660] REGS: c000000008dbfe80 TRAP: 3000 Tainted: G T (6.13.0-P9-dirty) [ 12.029735] MSR: 900000000280f032 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 42004848 XER: 00000000 [ 12.029855] IRQMASK: 0 GPR00: 0000000000000169 00003fffdcf789a0 00003fff83067100 0000000000000005 GPR04: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000090 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 GPR08: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 GPR12: 0000000000000000 00003fff836ff7e0 c000000000010678 0000000000000000 GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f28 00003fffdcf78f90 GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00003fffdcf78f80 GPR24: 00003fffdcf78f70 00003fffdcf78d10 00003fff835c7239 00003fffdcf78bd8 GPR28: 00003fffdcf78a98 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000011f547580 [ 12.030316] NIP [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.030361] LR [00003fff82f5cfa8] 0x3fff82f5cfa8 [ 12.030405] --- interrupt: 3000 [ 12.030444] ================================================================== Commit c28c15b ("powerpc/code-patching: Use temporary mm for Radix MMU") is inspired from x86 but unlike x86 is doesn't disable KASAN reports during patching. This wasn't a problem at the begining because __patch_mem() is not instrumented. Commit 465cabc ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce patch_instructions()") use copy_to_kernel_nofault() to copy several instructions at once. But when using temporary mm the destination is not regular kernel memory but a kind of kernel-like memory located in user address space. Because it is not in kernel address space it is not covered by KASAN shadow memory. Since commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan: instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault") KASAN reports bad accesses from copy_to_kernel_nofault(). Here a bad access to user memory is reported because KASAN detects the lack of shadow memory and the address is below TASK_SIZE. Do like x86 in commit b3fd8e8 ("x86/alternatives: Use temporary mm for text poking") and disable KASAN reports during patching when using temporary mm. Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <[email protected]> Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250201151435.48400261@yea/ Fixes: 465cabc ("powerpc/code-patching: introduce patch_instructions()") Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1c05b2a1b02ad75b981cfc45927e0b4a90441046.1738577687.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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…cal section
A circular lock dependency splat has been seen involving down_trylock():
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.12.0-41.el10.s390x+debug
------------------------------------------------------
dd/32479 is trying to acquire lock:
0015a20accd0d4f8 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: down_trylock+0x26/0x90
but task is already holding lock:
000000017e461698 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
-> #3 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
-> #2 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
-> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
-> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
The console_sem -> pi_lock dependency is due to calling try_to_wake_up()
while holding the console_sem raw_spinlock. This dependency can be broken
by using wake_q to do the wakeup instead of calling try_to_wake_up()
under the console_sem lock. This will also make the semaphore's
raw_spinlock become a terminal lock without taking any further locks
underneath it.
The hrtimer_bases.lock is a raw_spinlock while zone->lock is a
spinlock. The hrtimer_bases.lock -> zone->lock dependency happens via
the debug_objects_fill_pool() helper function in the debugobjects code.
-> #4 (&zone->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
__lock_acquire+0xe86/0x1cc0
lock_acquire.part.0+0x258/0x630
lock_acquire+0xb8/0xe0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xb4/0x120
rmqueue_bulk+0xac/0x8f0
__rmqueue_pcplist+0x580/0x830
rmqueue_pcplist+0xfc/0x470
rmqueue.isra.0+0xdec/0x11b0
get_page_from_freelist+0x2ee/0xeb0
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x2c2/0x520
alloc_pages_mpol_noprof+0x1fc/0x4d0
alloc_pages_noprof+0x8c/0xe0
allocate_slab+0x320/0x460
___slab_alloc+0xa58/0x12b0
__slab_alloc.isra.0+0x42/0x60
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x304/0x350
fill_pool+0xf6/0x450
debug_object_activate+0xfe/0x360
enqueue_hrtimer+0x34/0x190
__run_hrtimer+0x3c8/0x4c0
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x1b2/0x260
hrtimer_interrupt+0x316/0x760
do_IRQ+0x9a/0xe0
do_irq_async+0xf6/0x160
Normally a raw_spinlock to spinlock dependency is not legitimate
and will be warned if CONFIG_PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING is enabled,
but debug_objects_fill_pool() is an exception as it explicitly
allows this dependency for non-PREEMPT_RT kernel without causing
PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING lockdep splat. As a result, this dependency is
legitimate and not a bug.
Anyway, semaphore is the only locking primitive left that is still
using try_to_wake_up() to do wakeup inside critical section, all the
other locking primitives had been migrated to use wake_q to do wakeup
outside of the critical section. It is also possible that there are
other circular locking dependencies involving printk/console_sem or
other existing/new semaphores lurking somewhere which may show up in
the future. Let just do the migration now to wake_q to avoid headache
like this.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
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When mb-xdp is set and return is XDP_PASS, packet is converted from xdp_buff to sk_buff with xdp_update_skb_shared_info() in bnxt_xdp_build_skb(). bnxt_xdp_build_skb() passes incorrect truesize argument to xdp_update_skb_shared_info(). The truesize is calculated as BNXT_RX_PAGE_SIZE * sinfo->nr_frags but the skb_shared_info was wiped by napi_build_skb() before. So it stores sinfo->nr_frags before bnxt_xdp_build_skb() and use it instead of getting skb_shared_info from xdp_get_shared_info_from_buff(). Splat looks like: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/core/skbuff.c:6072 skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590 Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_tcpudp veth af_packet xt_conntrack nft_chain_nat xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink xfrm_user xt_addrtype nft_coms CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #3 RIP: 0010:skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590 Code: 4b fd ff ff 49 8b 34 24 40 80 e6 40 0f 84 3d fd ff ff 49 8b 74 24 48 40 f6 c6 01 0f 84 2e fd ff ff 48 8d 4e ff e9 25 fd ff ff <0f> 0b e99 RSP: 0018:ffffb62c4120caa8 EFLAGS: 00010287 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffffb62c4120cb14 RCX: 0000000000000ec0 RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: ffffa06e5d7dc000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: ffffa06e5d7ddec0 R08: ffffa06e6120a800 R09: ffffa06e7a119900 R10: 0000000000002310 R11: ffffa06e5d7dcec0 R12: ffffe4360575f740 R13: ffffe43600000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000002 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0755f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f147b76b0f8 CR3: 00000001615d4000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __warn+0x84/0x130 ? skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590 ? report_bug+0x18a/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? skb_try_coalesce+0x504/0x590 inet_frag_reasm_finish+0x11f/0x2e0 ip_defrag+0x37a/0x900 ip_local_deliver+0x51/0x120 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x64/0x70 ip_sublist_rcv+0x179/0x210 ip_list_rcv+0xf9/0x130 How to reproduce: <Node A> ip link set $interface1 xdp obj xdp_pass.o ip link set $interface1 mtu 9000 up ip a a 10.0.0.1/24 dev $interface1 <Node B> ip link set $interfac2 mtu 9000 up ip a a 10.0.0.2/24 dev $interface2 ping 10.0.0.1 -s 65000 Following ping.py patch adds xdp-mb-pass case. so ping.py is going to be able to reproduce this issue. Fixes: 1dc4c55 ("bnxt: adding bnxt_xdp_build_skb to build skb from multibuffer xdp_buff") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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4K VP9 media with 59.94 fractional refresh rate causes the screen to go blank (no sync) with the following error reported in system logs:
Modetest shows the following:
Tweaking DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST formula to use 1002 in calculations instead of 1001 results in 593406 and 4K 59.94 media plays correctly:
However 1001 is the correct value and essential for other fractional rates like 23.976.
Perhaps a precision or rounding error?
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